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Machshavah Lab
Machshavah Lab
Rambam on Divine Knowledge and Hashgachah (Part 1: False Views) Moreh 3:16-17a
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Length: 1 hour 28 minutes
Synopsis: This morning (5/15/26), in our Friday morning Sefer Iyov series for women, we moved on to the next - and last! - subseries within our overarching series on Iyov. Over the course of the next eight chapters, the Rambam presents his views on God's knowledge, hashgachah, and Sefer Iyov. Today we covered his overview of the false views: what led the philosophers to deny God's omniscience, and the four false views of hashgachah held from ancient times. Next time (בג"ה) we'll learn through the Rambam's presentation of the Torah's view and his own take on it.
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מקורות:
רמב"ם - מורה הנבוכים ג:טז-יז
Lenn E. Goodman and Phillip I. Lieberman, "The Guide to the Perplexed: A New Translation"
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The Torah content for the month of Iyyar is sponsored by Naomi Schwartz Rothschild in memory of her mother, Breindel Bracha bas Mordechai z”l, whose yahrzeit falls on the 8th of Iyyar. She learned and lived Torah, and was a tremendous baalas chesed.
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Okay, so we are now starting a new subseries within our overall series on EO. We completed, um, so we completed our um series on Rambom on Ra, uh, which is what I conceive of as Rambam in the morning book from 3.8 through 315. Technically, we're not quite done with it yet. Uh, we finished 312 last time, which is the types of raw in the world. Um, so that we are done with. And then the last chapter is what I'm planning to do for Sunday shear, uh, 315 about what God can and can't do. And then then we'll be done with that. So tune in for that or listen to the recording if uh if you can't make it to the shear. So today we're gonna start off with 316. What I hope to do today, so I'll show you the agenda today. I was gonna review what we did last time, um, but I am afraid that it's gonna take too long. And I I'm I have a kind of ambitious plan for today, which is I want to do 316 and the first half of 317. So 316 is about the denial of God's knowledge and what led people to deny God's knowledge. Technically speaking, we've done this before, but I did it in the form of a uh a flow chart, which I'll just show you here earlier in the year about why Eov denied uh God's knowledge. Uh, and that was basically my summary of the Rambaum. And I am not even teaching this to my high school students, uh, both because I already went over the flowchart with them and also for lack of time. And therefore, I have not learned through this uh as in depth as I have the other chapters I've been teaching. But I think because we've been going through every parak um inside, inside the text, I mean, I guess except for 314, um, I really feel like it's important for us to read the Rambam um and not rely on my summary. So we're gonna start with that. That should not take us too long because um I think it's fairly easy to follow. Then we're gonna do the first half of chapter 317. So, as you can see from this little outline here, the first half of 317 deals with four false views of Hajjgaha. And then in the second half of 317, the Ramam presents the Torah's view and then his take on the Torah's view, which goes through 318. So, what I I think the way it'll work is today I'd like to cover 316 and 317, which covers all of the false ideas, and then we'll devote uh next session, which I guess is in two weeks from now, because Shabuz is next week. Uh, that'll be on the Rambam's view of Hashkaha and the true ideas. Okay, that's the plan. Okay, so let's read this as usual. I'm using the uh synthesized translation of the Rambam from the six translations that I have. Uh the Goodman, Friedlander, Pinace, Kafik, Machbili, and Goldstein. Uh, I have not reviewed again, I have not reviewed this since I usually I vet all these translations, but uh uh we're we're just doing this. Uh uh, I just made this last minute decision to go through this this morning. Okay. Uh, and what we'll do is as usual, we will take notes as we go to summarize. Um, notes on 316, and today is the 15th. Okay. Okay, so uh he says like this the philosophers have spoken grave falsehoods concerning Hashem. May he be exalted, regarding his knowledge of what uh his knowledge of that which is other than himself, and they have stumbled a stumbling from which there is no recovery, neither for them nor for those who have followed after them in this view. I shall let you hear the doubts that led them to speak this falsehood, and I shall also let you hear the view of our Torah on this matter, and our refutation of their evil and repugnant views concerning Hashem's knowledge. Okay, so he's gonna go over the what the um what led them to their false views, what the reputation is, and then what the true view is concerning Hashem's knowledge. Also, as you can see from our um uh outline here, after the Ramam goes through uh the views of Hashgaha, he's gonna return to the subject of God's knowledge. So uh this is not exhausting the topic. Um, and I think it's telling that he starts off with mistakes about God's knowledge, which you'll see result in mistakes about Hajjgaha, and then he addresses the Hajjgaha and then he goes back to God's knowledge and then goes back to the Hajjgaha and God's knowledge and say for Eok. So uh I don't know why he goes in that order, but um, I I think that should be a question like on our radar about like the the sequencing of these points, which obviously we're not gonna be able to figure out uh entirely until we go through all of them. Okay, so um he says like this. I'm just gonna keep moving the text as we go through it. Oops. Okay. What chiefly caused them to fall into this and led them to it at the outset is what appears at first thought to be a lack of orderliness in the circumstances of human individuals. That some pious individuals lead lives that are wretched and full of suffering, while some wicked individuals lead lives that are good and pleasant. This led them to formulate the division you are about to hear. Okay, so this is the the thesis here is that that the philosophers um erred in their views, sorry, in their their views about God's knowledge um based on the apparent uh lack of order and uh uh and I guess like uh occurrence uh of seeming uh injustices in uh in human affairs, okay, in in I guess in in the circumstances of sorry, in the circumstances of some human uh of some people. Okay, so what what is this as a as opposed to what? I think this is a a key point here, all right. Like as opposed to what? In other words, like what what else might have led them to uh mistaken views of God's knowledge? What would you expect? Yeah, tomorrow.
SPEAKER_01Um I don't know how to finish the sentence, but like this is like an empirical conclusion as opposed to like a conclusion from philosophical.
SPEAKER_06Okay, good, good. Yeah, so methodology-wise, I think that that's good. I was gonna say it in a different way, but I think we're making the same point, which is that that they did not arrive at these false views by actually like working on the problem, the philosophical uh you know, uh, you know, understanding uh of God's knowledge. Okay. Rather, their mistakes, their mistake was a consequence of theodicy. Okay. In other words, theodicy meaning uh understanding of God's uh goodness in the world. So, so like in other words, there are I'm I'm sure there are philosophers who have like just tried to set out to understand what do we mean by God's knowledge, but but that's not what happened here, okay. And in fact, I think the Ram actually alludes to this um very briefly in the first sentence. He says, the philosophers have spoken great falsehoods concerning Hashem, maybe exalted, regarding his knowledge of that which is other than himself. Okay. So I don't know if he is necessarily endorsing the views that the philosophers had about God's knowledge of himself, but one big difference is if you're if you're talking about what it means for God to know himself, you're not going to run into issues of injustice because you're talking about God in himself. So it's possible that there they were able to think in an unbiased way. But then when it came to um to their thinking about God's knowledge of human affairs, that got tangled up in what they saw in human affairs. And you he'll spell it out very, very clearly. Okay. So uh here we go. Uh, here is the uh the reasoning uh that that led to their mistakes. Okay, they said, I'll summarize this actually afterwards. They said the matter cannot escape one of two alternatives. Either Hashem knows nothing of these individual circumstances and does not apprehend them, or he apprehends and knows them. This is a necessary division. Okay, so I'm gonna start with this. I'll I'll go back to the flow chart later on because I think I did do a pretty good job with the flow chart. So so uh their reasoning was as follows. Okay, so let's do step by step. Either God okay, so this starts off with starts off with the the uh the starting point, okay, is um there is a lack of order in human affairs and uh and uh just people uh you know, I guess pious people suffer. Okay, so either God knows uh um uh knows nothing of this, or he does know. Okay, those are two possibilities. Okay, only two possibilities. This is a necessary division. They then said if he apprehends them and knows them, the matter cannot escape one of three alternatives. Either he orders and manages them with the best, most complete, and most perfect order, or he is incapable of ordering them and has no power over them, or he knows and is able to order and manage them in the best way, but neglects to do so out of disdain or contempt or out of jealousy. Uh, just as we find among human beings, a person who is able to bring some benefit to another and who knows that the other person stands in need of that benefit, but who, owing to the wickedness of his nature and the malice of his jealousy, begrudges him and this does not uh and does not bring it to him. Uh yeah, Estee.
SPEAKER_03Sorry, is this is this things that people are consciously thinking through, or is this just like uh what people kind of beach one are assuming?
SPEAKER_06I don't know because I have not read the primary texts uh of the philosophers that he's referring to. Um so I would say at the very least, then this is unconscious. Um, but uh it's possible that this is also, you know, that they say this explicitly. I'm not sure.
SPEAKER_03Um, but the Rambom didn't specify. I didn't miss that.
SPEAKER_06Rombom, to my knowledge, the Rom did not specify. Um yeah, and I again I have not even looked at the um actually, you know what? Let me just check out one thing here. Um let me look at Professor Goodman's translation and see if he spells that is not the right one. I want Goodman. Okay, so let's see if he says anything in the footnotes. Okay. Um, well, I'm gonna read this and we'll see if we get anything out of it. He says, uh, so this is on the statement either God is wholly unaware of individual fortunes and knows nothing of them, or he does know and is aware of them. Uh necessary disjunction. So he refers us to Plato in the Parmenides, I think that's how you say it, uh, 134D. Despite Avicenna's protestations that not an atom escapes God's knowledge, Schwartz writes, the only particulars his God seems to know are the astral bodies, each a unique exemplar of its species. Maimonides Schwartz notes faces a dilemma. God's knowledge is himself. Okay, that that's a little bit more than we want. Let me just actually check uh Internet Classic Archives, and then I just want to see if we can quickly find how explicitly Plato, we're not gonna go through the Plato dialogue, obviously. I just want to see if we can find how explicitly Plato talks about this. Uh in farmen's um, does this not have numbers? 134. Oh, this version does not have numbers. Okay, fine. All right, I'm not gonna look at this up now. All right, so um, yeah, and it looks like the rest of this footnote is too too much. Uh so I I I I don't know, I'm not sure. Okay. Um okay, so just to summarize here, okay. If God knows about about uh about human affairs, um b or b he does not know. Okay, if God knows about human affairs, then one of three things must be true. Okay, so uh A, I guess one, um is everything really is governed uh with perfection. Okay or two um God uh is incapable of of governing human affairs um with perfection. Or three God is capable, but chooses not to out of some evil disposition. Okay. So uh and he gave uh he exe he gave examples where you are able again with in human affairs, and this is the the comparison to human beings is going to be very, very important here, right? So so let's just use uh I use the analogy I use with my students. Okay, so in in uh the high school I teach at, it's also um in an elementary school, okay. Uh there's elementary school students. So let's say you have let's say you're walking by a room and you look, you peer elementary school room and you peer in and you see a teacher sitting there with her back to the wind, like to the to the door, and you see a bunch of kids stabbing each other with pencils. Okay. So there are three possibilities. Okay. Either stabbing kids stabbing each other with pencils actually is totally just and good. Okay. And like there's nothing wrong with it, and this is really how things should be, okay? Or the teacher knows about it, and oh sorry, this is all within the teacher. The teacher knows about what's going on. So either the teacher knows about it, and this is by design, okay, or the teacher knows about it, but is incapable of intervening, and that's why it's happening. Or the teacher knows and is capable, but she wants the kids to fight to the death. Okay. So those are the three three possibilities. All right. Um, and and that the wanting to fight to the death meaning uh that that that's like uh evil and not in line with justice. Yeah, I see.
SPEAKER_03Slightly off topic, but that's one of Sam Harris's um the last one is one of his arguments that there is a rational case for morality, is that like if you were in a department store and you're buying something for your kid for their birthday and there's a button, and if you push it, it will help a kid with you know, starving in Africa or a kid with cancer or something like that, and you don't push it, then that is like there is an innate sense of evil that a person could rationally argue. It's just interesting. It's like a side point, but I just think it's interesting. Samar says the whole thing about the basics. That is interesting.
SPEAKER_06That's actually on my my list of things uh for the summer. I forgot what his book is, but I I did buy a book of his on morality because I just I don't understand how he seemingly denies free will, but also talks about morality. Um so Yeah, yeah.
SPEAKER_03Well, I don't think he's whatever I kind of have other things to say about some hammers, but if you want a really good article that's a follow-up to his book that answers the problems people have with his book, then you kind of get the argument that's in the book plus his update, which I thought was really interesting and useful. I can't remember, I'll send it to you.
SPEAKER_06All right, thanks. Um, because we just got two people to join us, I just want to recap where we're at here. Okay, so um Ramam is going through uh the false views that the philosophers arrived at about God's knowledge. And they did not arrive at these views based on thinking about God's knowledge. They really arrived at it based on problems that they saw in God's justice. And the Ramam is talking through what the reasoning is. So he says the starting point of the reasoning is they took it for granted that there is a lack of order and justice in human affairs, okay, and then they basically reasoned as follows either God does not know about this, about what's going on in human affairs, or he does know. If he does know, so then there's only three possibilities. Either he knows and what what appears to be injustice really is just and everything is really going fine. Or he knows and the reason why he's not intervening is because he's incapable, or he knows, and the reason why he's not intervening is because he has some sort of evil disposition or some like like bad reason for not uh not intervening. Okay. So now the Ram says this division too is necessary and correct. I mean to say that anyone who knows a particular thing cannot escape one of these. Either he exercises providence in managing what he knows, or he neglects it as a person neglects the management of the cats in his house, for example, uh, or of some uh uh of something more contemptible still. And one who does exercise providence over a matter is sometimes incapable of managing it, even though he wishes to. Can I get my um Rambam cats image? Yeah, uh this was the uh I think I wrote about this earlier and know what I'm thinking about this morning post. I picture the Ramam writing this in the morning as cats like overrun him and are um, you know, trying to disrupt him from doing what they're saying, he just can't control them. Okay, so um, so so in other words, uh you know, it sounds like the Ram is just giving these examples from human beings, but we're gonna see that the comparison to humans is part of the problem. All right, that's a foreshadowing. Okay. Now, once they had this division, uh, they rendered their verdict and declared that two of the three alternatives, which are necessarily applicable to anyone who knows, are impossible with respect to Hashem, namely that he is unable or that he is able but does not exercise providence, since these would entail an evil disposition or impotence. And he is exalted above both. Okay, so so once they arrived at these three possibilities, they ruled out two of them. Okay, lack of ability, uh, because God is omnipotent, uh, and lack of um sorry, and uh, and and uh evil because God is good. Um, because God is good. Okay, so now if you're going to uh go back here, so in other words, they're they're ruling out possibility three and possibility two, okay. Um there remains uh then of the whole division only this that he does not know any of these circumstances at all, or that he knows them and orders them with the best possible order. Okay, so now all that's left is either everything, either he knows it and everything is governed with perfection. I'll just type this out again. So um this leaves two possibilities. Uh okay, either God knows what's going on, and everything really is governed in line with justice, okay, or God doesn't know what's going on, and that is why uh there is injustice. All right. Um he says there remains only full of division only this, uh yeah, uh, that he does not know any of these circumstances at all, or that he knows of them and orders them with the best possible order. But we find them to be without order, not following any logical pattern and not unfolding as they ought. And this therefore is a proof that he does not know them in any way or by any cause. Okay. So uh they concluded that since we don't see any order or justice, it must be that God doesn't know what's going on. Okay, that is their um, that's how they arrived at the conclusion of denying God's knowledge. Okay, so he says like this this is what caused them to fall at the outset into this grave falsehood. You will find all that I've summarized for you of their division, together with my observation that this is the point of their error, set forth. Oh, there you go, Estee. This answers your question, set forth and explained in the treatise of Alexander of Aphrodisius on governance or on providence. Okay. So I guess at least one philosopher who was an uh an Aristotelian, Alexander of Aphrodisius, um, spells this out like uh explicitly. Okay, there's that. All right. So now the Rambom uh criticizes their view. Okay, he says like this uh from two angles. He says, Behold and marvel at how they fell into something worse than what they fled from, and how they showed themselves ignorant of the very matter to which they never ceased to direct our attention and which they always explain to us. Okay, so Rambom's critique is twofold. Sorry, critique is um is uh is twofold. Okay. Um they they fell into a worse error than what they were trying to avoid, uh sorry, trying to avoid um and um they exhibited uh uh severe ignorance uh about the subject. Okay, so what what what what does that mean? So he says like this as for their falling into something worse than what they fled from, they fled from attributing neglect to Hashem, and they ruled concerning him that he lacks knowledge and that everything in the lower world is hidden from him and not apprehended by him. Okay, so now I I don't know if the Ramam is saying this objectively that this is a worse view or or this is the Ramam's like uh judgment. In other words, so he's saying like they in uh they attempted to avoid ascribing uh neglect to God, um uh and instead posited ignorance. Okay. So it it does sound like the wrong one saying that that uh saying that God is ignorant is worse than saying that he is unjust. Yeah, SD.
SPEAKER_03Well, wouldn't it be worse because you're saying something you're positing something about God essentially instead of God's actions?
SPEAKER_06Okay, that's a good that that's one way to look at it. Yeah, that that that's uh that's a good um uh a good uh inference. Um okay. As for their ignorance regarding the matter to which they never cease to direct our attention, it is that they examine existence by Way of the circumstances of human individuals whose evils come either from themselves or from the necessity of the nature of matter, as they themselves continually say and explain. We have already clarified what needs to be said on this. Okay. So they um they uh they also um uh you know exhibited ignorance about the nature and categories of Ra. Okay. Um that that all you know, in other words, like so basically all the mistakes that we went over before. Okay, they they judged uh you know the the entirety of existence, you know, uh or God's conduct by what happens to specific individuals and they they overlooked the fact that all this ra is either I guess either stems from the nature of matter or from human free will, okay, as we explained in 312. Okay, so in other words, they they uh they purport to be trying to understand God's justice, which is the the evil in the world, but they don't even have a correct understanding of Ra. And then in their misguided attempt to explain why this Ra is happening, they they attribute ignorance to God, which is uh is an essential mistake. Okay, so it's a double whammy. Okay. Um again, feel free to interrupt me if you have uh questions here, as always. Okay, he goes on. Once they had laid down a principle, uh, this foundation, which demolishes every sound foundation and disfigures the beauty of every correct view, they then set about removing its strangeness and supposed that knowledge of these things is impossible for the creator from several angles. Okay, so this is a critical move here, okay, is after arriving at this conclusion that God lacks knowledge, they they sensed its uh its uh its strangeness um and attempted to rationalize it by ex by by uh explaining that such knowledge is impossible for God. Okay, and again, just to point you to the sequencing of the chapters here, again, you can now see. I mean, it's beautiful what the Ramam is doing here, okay? You could see how necessary it was for the Ramam to go through everything he went through. He spent uh 3.8 through 312 talking about the nature of Ra, okay, um, and then arguably 313 and 314 as well, about um how we cannot understand why God designed the universe to have these features. And then he talked about what is impossible for God and that there are things that are impossible for God, which again is what Sunday's year is going to be about. And then he says basically that these uh these philosophers then argue that it's impossible for God to have knowledge of these things. Okay, how so? Um, so here are their arguments. He he's he uh lists them very briefly. Um, among them. So among the the ways that they said it's impossible for God to know these things, uh yeah, among them that particulars are apprehended only by the senses and not by the intellect, and Hashem does not apprehend by means of a sense. Okay, so so um particulars require uh, you know, uh are only apprehended by the senses, and God doesn't have senses. Okay, that's that's argument number one. I think that was um uh that's close to Immanuel Kant. I think, I mean, he doesn't say by sense, but like in the particularities of space-time, and God is outside of space-time, so he can't uh apprehend those particulars. Uh, among them that particulars are without end, while knowledge is a comprehensive encompassing, and that which has no end cannot be encompassed by knowledge. Okay, so particulars are infinite, um uh whereas knowledge is uh discrete, uh meaning like uh all-encompassing, uh, and and it is impossible for knowledge to uh to apprehend all particulars. I'm gonna go with one more, then I'll call on you, SD. Among them, that knowledge of things that come into being newly, which are without doubt particulars, would entail in him some change, since it is a renewal of knowledge after knowledge, okay, is that particulars change and God doesn't change. So um uh so it uh so if sorry, and and if it were true that he knew changing particulars, he would have to change. So so obviously he can't know particulars. Uh now I don't know if Aristotle says this outright, but that I know that that's attributed to Aristotle because that's why Aristotle holds that the universe is eternal and God has knowledge only of the eternally existing facets of the universe, like the spheres and the species and thing and mathematical truths, but God, according to Aristotle, doesn't know change particulars. So if I go like how many fingers am I holding up and I'm changing my fingers, God doesn't know that. Yeah, ST.
SPEAKER_03Well, I had a question on the first one, but now I have a question on the last one, which I'll ask first. Um so for that last one, so that's because the the physical universe is changing in our perception, like from our angle, wherefore God can't know if the key from his knowledge will be changing.
SPEAKER_06Right, that's my understanding.
SPEAKER_03Okay, and in terms of the first one, was that just like um what do you call it? Like uh they're just positing the God, like why why would you say the knowledge for the particulars can't like is just different? Like what is your basis for that? The other ones that heard bases for all that.
SPEAKER_06Yeah, I think their reasoning is that that is what particular particulars are physical things, and uh and we apprehend them through our physical senses, um, as opposed to let's say mathematical truths which are not physical, which we can apprehend directly with our mind. So I think they're they're saying that, like, how could you know a physical thing unless you had some physical apparatus by which you apprehended it? That's my sense of what they're saying.
SPEAKER_03And that's different from other things that you would know? I mean, doesn't all knowledge come through?
SPEAKER_06Um, right. Yeah, it's different from from let's say the uh well, mathematical truths is the easy one because that's not particular.
SPEAKER_03And then theoretically, the laws of nature, you could never you can't get any knowledge of any of those things without coming through physical knowledge.
SPEAKER_06We can't get any knowledge except through physical through through through the physical senses.
SPEAKER_03Oh I understand. So you're saying that the abstractions that we get to through our physical knowledge is what's okay. Gotcha. Exactly, yeah. Yeah. And I just actually can finish my sense the abstractions that we get through our physical knowledge are knowable without knowing the deep, that those don't include the details. So our knowledge of the details is not included in that knowledge of that.
SPEAKER_06Uh, I don't know if I entirely follow that. So let me try saying it and you tell me if I'm missing the point, is that we gain knowledge of unchanging universals through our sensory particulars, but God can have knowledge of the sensory, sorry, of the uh of the unchanging universals because he created them or because they stem from his existence. He doesn't need to go through the particulars. But if you said he knew the particulars, that would seem to require like some physical apparatus to know them. And the example I give, which is I don't know if this is a good analogy, but like there's no way for me to feel the table unless I have something that has something in quality with the table, which is a feeler, you know. There's no way I can I can see, you know, uh, or let's say like uh hear sound waves, uh, which is vibrations of the particles in the air, unless I have something in me that vibrates in my ear, you know. So so for God to perceive particulars would require some sort of physical apparatus. That's their reasoning.
SPEAKER_03Right. And and and even though we approach them through time in our development of our understanding, they exist eternally. So God's knowledge of them is existent and internal and doesn't involve right. I think that's their premise.
SPEAKER_06Right. Certainly the Aristotelians uh would hold that. Yeah. Okay.
SPEAKER_03Can we talk through the second one again?
SPEAKER_06Sure. The second one is um is uh okay, I I I'll talk through what I understand of it, okay, which is that um which is like if I know, let's say, for example, let me think of an example that is going to lend itself to this. Okay, let's say I know um planetary motions, okay. So I can just know the principle of planetary motions, and theoretically, as long as the planets follow those laws, then I I'll know like the principle itself, even though the it plays itself out many times. Okay, fine. So I can know the principle, even though it plays itself itself out many times. Or let's say in math, right? If I can know um, you know, Pythagorean theorem, so then I know the universal, even though there's an infinite number of triangles that you can make that uh you know that conform to that. But if you're gonna claim that I know the particulars, the particulars are infinite. So it's by definition impossible to know the particulars as particulars, because knowledge has to encompass all of them and particulars are infinite. And so I think it's it's I think this is like one of these like infinity problems is the how can you have knowledge of infinite particulars if you know, except via a universal. You can't like know the particulars as particulars, you can only know them through a universal. That's why they're saying that God doesn't know the particulars. I think that's what he's saying. Let me actually just check again in the Goodman and see if he elaborates. Um oh, by the way, you see, I I have mentioned in my critiques of Goodman that he sometimes um takes the idiomatic translations a little bit too far. He says, So, what we translated as um behold and marvel at how they fell into something worse than what they fled from. He look how he translates it. Amazing! They got out of the frying pan and into the fire, you know. Now that's that it conveys it, but like, you know, uh it's not an exact translation. So uh whatever. Okay, anyway, uh let's see what he says about the particulars here. So he says like this having laid this foundation, which undermines every good principle that they had, uh they had and scars every fair view they held, they tried to mitigate the incongruity by ruling knowledge of such things impossible for God, given grounds like these particulars are perceived only by senses, not by reason, but God does not use sense perception. Or particulars are infinite and knowledge means comprehension, but the infinite cannot be comprehended. Okay, so he doesn't elaborate here, um, but uh my intuition was correct that it has to do with infinity. Let's look at Makbili. Uh yeah, Mehen she Insof lipratim, there's no end to particulars, the Iluha Yedia Makifa, but knowledge is all encompassing. The Yadia Ino Yeholil Hakif ain's off. And and knowledge cannot encompass infinity. Uh let's just see if he comments on this. No, he doesn't. Okay, yeah, so that's all I got. Sorry if I okay. Um, so that is their mistake. Okay, now he's gonna switch to the Torah's view. Uh question again, number one. Oh, sorry, I didn't see your hand, yeah. Um, okay.
SPEAKER_05So for number one, did you give a reason why that is false?
SPEAKER_06Uh Rahman will. I did not. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. And with regard to our claim, we, the community of those who hold to the Torah, that he knew them before they came to be, they raised again, oh, sorry, not yet. They raised two difficulties. The first that knowledge would be bound up with absolute non-existence. The second, that knowledge of a thing's existence in potentiality and the knowledge of uh of its existence in actuality would be one and the same. I do not understand this, but I'm just gonna say it anyway. Here is uh the above uh mistakes were based on the premise that the universe is eternal. Okay, but these philosophers have additional um uh problems with our view that God knew these things uh as the creator um by virtue of his bringing them into existence out of nothing. Okay, so their problems with our view are number one, that knowledge would be bound up with absolute non-existence. That knowledge would be bound up with absolute non-existence. I I have an intuition, uh or but which I'll say in a second, or uh also the second that the knowledge of the things' existence in potentiality and the knowledge of existence in actuality would be one and the same. Okay, I'm just gonna copy and paste this because I don't know what that means. Okay, now I I don't know for sure, but in preparation for this Sunday share, hold on. In in preparation for the Sunday share, I read a paper called Mimonides on Possibility by someone named Alfred L. Ivry. I don't know uh who he is or when he wrote this. Um, but he talks about how one of the problems that Aristotle had, or not problems, one of the things that we disagree with. Okay, one of the problems that Aristotle had, which I will plan on talking about on Sunday, is Aristotle had a problem with the idea of absolute non-existence. Um, we hold that the un that God created the universe out of absolute non-existence, but Aristotle held that existence can only come from potentiality, and potentiality has some level of existence. Um, and I sense that that has to do with these problems that these philosophers had about us, but I don't really know what it is, and I don't think it's important for our purposes here. Okay, so just know that the first three problems were according to their view of the universe being eternal, and then they have additional two problems with our view. Okay. Um, okay, so now he goes on and has one more blow against them uh before he says our view, I think. Uh they became so entangled in their thinking that one of them said he knows only the species and not the particulars, while another says he knows nothing whatsoever outside his own essence at all, so that there should not be, according to his supposition, a multiplicity of cognitions in him. This is really two more problems here, okay. Um, or not it's alluding to two more problems, but he says they they can they they then worked out ways that God does know what he knows. So, for example, um that God only knows the species. Again, species is not used in a uh biology sense, but like the the genus, okay, um, uh, and not the particulars. Okay, so for example, that would be like saying that God does not actually know um, you know, like that the sun rises, but he knows the laws that govern them and doesn't know the particulars, or something like that. Uh, or that God only knows himself. Um uh and um and since he is one, there uh this this solves the problem of knowledge creating uh multiplicity. Okay, so again, I don't care about the details here. The point is that that these uh this is a form of apologetics where uh where well not really apologetics, sorry, I shouldn't say apologetics. Um they were confronted, they're they're not thinking through these ideas in a pure bottom-up way. They're starting with the premise that God can't know particulars because that would result because that we wouldn't be able to explain injustice. And then they're trying to work out a theory of God's knowledge based on that difficulty. Okay, that's the uh that's the move he's trying to make here. Okay, um, so then he goes on and says more. Okay.
SPEAKER_03Um can you say that last thing again?
SPEAKER_06Yeah, is that the point here is really the point he started off with, which is that that they're not purely working out of uh a theory of divine knowledge. What they're doing is they are trying to avoid confronting the issue of injustice and then working out a theory of divine knowledge in reaction to that. It's like a reactionary type of thinking, it's not a chathila type of thinking. Okay. Um, and among the philosophers, there is one who holds a view like ours that he, may he be exalted, knows everything, knows everything, and that nothing whatsoever is hidden from him. These are the great men who preceded Aristotle in time. Uh, and Alexander too mentioned them in the aforementioned treatise of his, but he does not accept their view and says that the greatest of the contradictions against it is what we see of the evils that befall the righteous and the goods that the wicked attain. Okay, so I don't know who he's this. I actually am curious who he's talking about here. I don't know if he's talking about Plato. Um went too far. Yeah, the he says some philosophers held as we do that he knows all things, that nothing is hidden from him. There were some of the greats before Aristotle's time that, according to Goodman, is the pre-Socratic Xenophanes. Xenophanes speaks of one God, greatest among gods, and then uh in no way like mortals in body or in thought, who is always in the same place, utterly unmoved, but without toil, he shakes all things by his mind's thought, and all of him sees all things, all hears. Xenophanes is known to Arabic writers. All right, fine. So I don't I've never heard of this guy. Um so he says, some philosophers uh held like we do, but were rejected uh by uh the Aristotelians. Okay, fine. In sum, it has uh oh, sorry, read by uh rejected by the Aristotelians because of the theodicy problems. All right. Um, in sum, it has become clear to you that all of them, had they found the circumstances of human individuals to be ordered according to what appears as order to the multitude, would not have fallen into any of this speculation and would not have launched into it. Rather, the primary cause of this speculation is the examination of the circumstances of human beings, the good and the evil among them, and that this matter according to their supposition is not ordered, as the ignorant among us have said, Loi tahind derekashem, the way of Hashem is not right. Okay, so that's again a reiteration of where the Ramam started and what I reiterated just a little while ago, which is that all these mistaken views of divine knowledge um were uh were produced by their mistaken assessment of the lack of order in human affairs. Okay. Had they um had they uh I guess um correctly understood the the order in human affairs, uh their their beliefs in I guess they they they never would have arrived at these theories of divine knowledge. Okay. Um oh I guess he didn't allude to this. Ayala, I thought he was gonna allude to an answer. I'll tell you uh in a second. Uh now that I've explained that the matters of knowledge and providence are bound up with one another, I shall begin to explain the views of the speculative thinkers concerning providence. Uh, and after that, I shall take up resolving their difficulties concerning Hashem's knowledge of particulars. Yeah. So Ayala, he's really gonna address this in 319, 20, and 21. But the the main answer to how we would address all of this, and the answer to um the reason why we don't have these problems is because when we talk about God's knowledge, we're using the turocally, and that God's knowledge is not at all the same as our knowledge. Whereas these people were all assuming that there's a certain uh commonality between God's knowledge and our knowledge. Okay, that's where the problem is going ultimately. Okay, so that is the end of this chapter, and I'll just show you the chart that we saw months ago, just to show how I uh I drew it out here. And again, I did this in an animated way, but I'm not gonna bring up the animation. So we observe a lack of justice in human affairs. So so we start with the assumption that God is all-knowing, but then now you're faced into two um two possibilities. Either God's Hajjgaha extends to human individuals, uh, to individuals, and human affairs really are in line with justice, or God's Hajjgaha extends to individuals, and human affairs are not governed in line with justice. Now, if they're not in line with justice, it's either because God is incapable of doing so, or because he's capable and he chooses not to. But we reject the incapability because God is omnipotent, and we reject the lack of desire because God is not evil. So now we have to say that really things are according to human uh to justice, but we don't say that because we see a lack of justice. So we not we, but Eov and these philosophers reject God's knowledge and they conclude that God is not all knowing. And therefore, since God is not all knowing, then there is not going to be Hajjga on that which he doesn't know. And that What leads them into these uh uh theories about God's knowledge? All right, so that's my uh my uh pictorial uh uh depiction here. Okay, and with that, we are done with 316. Any questions on what we just went over? The the upshot is is that all of this stems from not learning the Rambaum in 3.8 through 3 uh 15 about what the nature of evil is and um and uh and not making these conclusions based on like a few individuals again, I'm I'm kind of being facetious because the Ram is gonna have to go into Hashgaka here. Yeah, Rivka.
SPEAKER_00Um so if it's a question you guys already addressed and I missed, I apologize. But is it fair to say that just because God can be God can be all-knowing but not controlling, you know? So why didn't Ev um come to that conclusion, I guess, and his friends, like God could be all-knowing, but he doesn't force um the outcome or anything in the world?
SPEAKER_06Right. So I think that would fall into um so so if you say God knows, so let's take a situation, let's take a classic situation of like a an innocent child, you know, gets a uh, you know, a disease, okay, and or is the victim of a of a of you know violence and war, right? So if you say God knows about that child, and what is happening to the child is unjust and God is not doing anything about it, so then these philosophers are saying that that's either because God can't do anything about it, or because he won't do anything about it. And and they are refusing to accept that possibility. We're gonna see that a little bit more today, because they'd view that as unjust. And again, the example I gave, uh, I don't know if this was before you came in, is if you walk by a classroom uh in Nija uh and you see uh two kids stabbing each other with pencils and a teacher watching them and not doing anything, so you would say, This teacher knows what's going on and can stop them, so why doesn't she? You know, and so so either she can't or she won't, and both of those are bad. So it must be that she's asleep and she doesn't know, you know. Um, so that that's like the reasoning that they're going over here. The answer that you're saying is is gonna ultimately be um where the Torah holds, which is that that God allows for free will. And that's what we kind of addressed in uh in last week when we said that uh of the types of raw in the world, type one is the is the nature of physical matter, but two and three are due to free will, the raw that people cause to each other and the raw that we do to ourselves, and God allows that to happen because he wants human beings to have free will, you know. So that is part of the answer here. But but the the the line of reason that we were tracing today, the philosophers would say that that is uh that God would be unjust for allowing that to happen. Yeah, uh Tamar?
SPEAKER_02Um, would you say that the primary cause of this mistake is the misunderstanding of Ross? I mean, it seems like there's a methodological methodological mistake of like placing their interpretation of human ram above all other considerations, but then also the there's like the whole thing that we did with the classification of ram and the cause of raw and like that kind of misunderstanding. And then after they make this mistake, then they make further mistakes related to things like God's knowledge in their trying to save this theory.
SPEAKER_06Yeah. So that that is, I think, what the Ramam says in this uh part that I just highlighted here, which I'm gonna read again. Uh, as for their ignorance regarding the matter to which they never ceased to direct our attention, it is that they examine existence by way of the circumstances of human individuals uh whose evils come either from themselves or from the necessity of the nature of matter, as they themselves continually say and explain. So I uh we've already clarified what needs to be said on this in 312. So I am getting from that that the ROM is criticizing them for not getting straight what it what ra is and why it has to be in the nature of the world. Uh and and and so there is a mistake in in how they're assessing raw. Does that answer your question?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I guess I was just trying to like spell out the relationship between this understanding of Ra that the Rambach develops and the mistake that these people are making. But it seems like that's kind of like that's like their whole thing. You know, that's like the whole root of the issue.
SPEAKER_06Yeah, and I think that's why he started that chapter with Al-Razi, who attempted to scientifically demonstrate that there's more evil in the universe than good, by counting up all of the instances of suffering that we have and saying that that if you add them all up, it's more than the the good we experience. So I think that's like he used that as like a prime example of a philosopher making this mistake and just being totally ignorant of like the the nature of Ra and the and the categories. Okay, now let's move on to the next part of our agenda, which is the first half of chapter 317, which is we're gonna go over the false views of Hajjgaha. Okay. He says like this there are five. Oh, let me start a new thing of notes. Uh, notes on 317a, 515, 26. Okay. There are five views people hold about Hajgaha, about providence. Okay. Um, all of them are ancient. That is, they are views that were already heard in the times of the prophets since the true Torah appeared and illuminated all this darkness. Now, I think the reason why he has to say this is because two, well, okay, all the views he's gonna quote are from modern thinkers, okay. Um, but he's claiming that these views already existed in the time of the Neveeim, and the modern thinkers he's quoting are just like the the most recent or the best versions of them of these false theories. Okay. So so he's saying uh there are five views of Hajjgacha. Okay. Um uh yeah. Uh so the false view number one is Epicurus. Now I'm gonna ask you the same question I asked my students when I was teaching them word a word of the day. Um, does the word, does the name Epicurus remind you of any words? Okay, there's an English word and there's a Hebrew word uh that is related to Epicurus or possibly related to Epicurus.
SPEAKER_05Apicorus.
SPEAKER_06Right. So one is Apicorus. So I think we don't actually know where the word Apicorus comes from. It's definitely not a Hebrew word, okay, because it's uh, you know, it doesn't have the Sharashim. Some say it was derived from the Hebrew word hefker of like ownerless. Others say that it derives from Epicurus because one of the forms of heresy is the belief that the Raman is going to say. So that's one. And then what's the other thing Epicurus is known for? What is an Epicurean or an epicure?
SPEAKER_03Like pleasure seeking, like refinement through pleasure.
SPEAKER_06So in modern uh vocabulary, an epicure is someone who enjoys like the finer pleasures in life. Uh, and I don't really know this so much, but my understanding is Epicurus was a philosophical hedonist who maintained that pleasure is the ultimate good, not in the wild, like, you know, orgiastic sense of like just a reveler in pleasure, like a low life, but but in the idea that that the only good is pleasure. And I think he even did hold that intellectual pleasure is the greatest pleasure, but he held that pleasure was the greatest good. And I'm only mentioning this now because I I always wonder whether there is uh interrelatedness in his philosophy between his ethics, which is centered around pleasure, and then his views of of God. I I don't know for sure. Yeah, Steve.
SPEAKER_03I think there was an element of restraint being a way of elevating, like in other words, you can't just if you just indulge in everything, you're not going to enjoy it. So you know, it's like a refinement of how to enjoy it.
SPEAKER_06Yeah, it's almost like a misleadic take on on uh on how to get the most enjoyment out of life. Yeah. Okay, so false view number one, Epicurus. The first view is that of those who hold uh that there is no providence whatsoever over anything in this entire existence, that everything in it, the heavens and what is other than them, came about by chance, and however things happen to fall out, uh, and and however things happen to fall out, and that there's no orderer, no governor, no overseer of anything. This is the view of Epicurus. He also maintains the doctrine of atoms, holding that they combine by chance and that whatever comes into being from them is generated by chance. Those of Israel who were heretics held this view, and they're the ones who of whom it is said they have denied Hashem and said it is not he. Aristotle has demonstrated the falsity of this view, showing that it is impossible for all things to exist by chance, but rather they have an orderer and a governor, and we have already mentioned something of this earlier. Okay, so this is uh fal sorry, this is false view number one, Epicurus. So uh denial of Hajjgaha. Now I I'm gonna clarify, I'm gonna interject some things in here just for the sake of making it easier for us to follow. Okay, so I'm I'm not this is usually I try to summarize in the Ramam's words as much as possible, but I'm gonna inject modern terms here. So denial of Hajjgaha, both Hajjgaha Clawlis nature and Hajjgaha Pratis uh is individual providence, okay. Uh sorry, uh yeah, um uh he denied Hajjgaha, okay, um and maintained that all occurrences and existences in the universe are due to chance, okay. Um this apparently was a view of the atomists, uh, of which Lucretius and Democritus were like the earliest ones. Um, and this is not like what we hold about atoms. So we, and by we, uh I mean um I don't know about Essie's dad, but uh but uh many scientists, majority of scientists, hold that reality is comprised of of particles of some sort. Okay. And um, and that's that theory was first advanced by these atomists, but the difference between them and modern science is that they held that everything was just random. Uh, and Rob Bog always points out that they denied the existence of the formal cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause, and said that everything is just in the material cause. And what we perceive to be as like order and lawfulness is really in some ways just like an illusion. Um, modern-day atomists hold that there are laws of nature. Like, yeah, there are particles, but they're governed by laws of nature. Now, I don't know about what quantum physicists hold and that that changes anything, but like certainly in the tradition of modern science, then the majority of people who hold by atoms hold that those atoms are governed by laws of nature that we can study. But Epicurus held, no, it's all just like chance. And I want to clarify this because when you first read this, it sounds like he's he's just saying that the origin of the universe was chance, okay, which some scientists hold now. But he's really saying no, everything is just chance, and there's no actual order in anything. So that's what I mean by denying nature, okay. All right, that's false view number one, and that's all the Ram has to say about him. He's not gonna come back to him because he holds that Aristotle took care of him already. Okay, false view number two, Aristotle. Um, and I'm gonna give you a little spoiler alert. Uh, the Ramam, uh, next time we learn together, Ramam is going to say that he partially agrees with Aristotle. So as we go through this, you can kind of ask yourself, what of Aristotle's beliefs does the Torah agree with and what does it dispute? Okay, but we're not going to answer that today. The second view is that of those who hold that some things are subject to providence, governed by a governor and ordered by an orderer, while others are abandoned to chance. This is the view of Aristotle. And I shall now summarize to you his view on providence. He holds that God exercises providence over the celestial spheres and that which is in them. Now, remember, celestial spheres was their belief that you have the geocentric universe where the earth is at the center and there's a bunch of concentric spheres around them. And the spheres are made of an ethereal um fifth element that is physical but unchanging and is perfect, and that the uh it have the spheres have the heavenly bodies embedded in them, and they're governed by perfect intelligences, which we call angels, and that those motions are responsible for all the changes that occur in the world of coming to be and passing away on earth. So the heavens are physical and move, but they are not subject to generation and corruption, and they're kind of responsible causally for everything that happens on earth. So um he owed the God exercises providence over the celestial spheres and what is in them, and for this reason, their individual members endure permanently as they are. Uh, Alexander of Aphrodisius has explained that in Aristotle's view, divine providence terminates as at the sphere of the moon. Uh, this is a corollary of his root doctrine of the eternity of the universe, for he holds that providence corresponds to the nature of existence. Accordingly, in the case of these spheres and what they contain, whose individual members are permanent, the meaning of providence with respect to them is their permanence in an unchanging state. And just as their existence necessarily entails the existence of other beings whose individual members are not permanent, but whose species are, so too there overflows from that providence what is sufficient to secure the permanence and continuity of the species, though it is not possible for their individual members to endure. Now, that was a lot of words, okay? Did anyone get a sense of what the core of Aristotle's belief in Hajjgaha is based on that first paragraph, even though we're not done yet?
SPEAKER_04Yeah, tomorrow.
SPEAKER_06Correct. Okay, so uh Aristotle uh affirmed the existence of Hajjgaha Claulis, nature, um based on uh the the uh on observing uh sorry, which which he held governed all aspects of the universe that exhibited order, lawfulness, and permanence. Okay, so that is the the key thing for understanding Aristotle's view. Okay, let's read on because it's gonna get clearer. Uh hold on. Um moving this. Okay. Nor are the individual members of any species abandoned entirely. Rather, whatever portion of that matter has been refined to the point of receiving the form of growth, meaning plants, has been given powers that preserve it for a fixed time, drawing it toward what is suitable for it and repelling what is of no use to it. And whatever has been refined further beyond this, until it has received the form of sensation, meaning animals, has been given other powers to preserve and protect it, and has been given an additional capacity of movement, so that it may approach what is suitable for it and flee from what is contrary to it. Each individual has been given whatever its species requires. And whatever has been refined still further, until it has received the form of intellect, has been given another power by which it governs, thinks, and reflects upon what makes possible the endurance of the individual and the preservation of its species in accordance with the perfection of that individual. So just gonna add here um, including, so whatever exhibits order, lawfulness, and permanence, including um species of plants, animals, and humans, and the faculties necessary for their continued existence. Okay. And he adds, Roman adds, um all this uh is a consequence of Aristotle's view of the eternity of the universe. And this is a little difficult for us to think about here, but you know, Aristotle held not only are the laws of nature eternal and like fixtures of the universe, but he held that species were also eternal. So cows always existed and oak trees always existed, and therefore, you know, just as gravity is just a permanent, unchanging fixture that governs existence, so too the the continuing species and everything that allows them to continue, that is all under Hajgacha. Okay, but what does he hold as not Hajjgaha? He says like this. But other motions that occur among individual members of a species occur by chance. And according to Aristotle, they are not the result of govern the governance of a governor or the ordering of an orderer. For example, and this is going to be an important example because the Ram is going to come back to this when he says his own view. If a wind blows, whether stormy or not, there is no doubt that it will cause some leaves to fall from this tree, break branches off another, dislodge a stone from a heap of stones, raise dust upon some plants and ruin them, churn up the sea so that a sea, a ship that happened to be there is wrecked, and all those on board or some of them drown. He sees no difference between the falling of that leaf, the falling of the stone, and the drowning of those great and noble men who were on the ship. Okay, likewise, he draws no distinction between an ox that drops its dung on a colony of ants and kills them, and a building whose foundations give way and which collapses upon those preying within it so that they die. Nor does he distinguish between a cat that comes upon a mouse and devours it, or a spider that catches a fly and a hungry lion that meets a prophet and devours him. Okay, so that is another point, okay, is I'm actually gonna break this into bullet points here, okay? So um uh affirms Hajgacha flawless, uh, but denies Hajgacha Pratis. Okay, and then let's just say uh he held uh by a Hajjgacha that governed all aspects of the universe that exhibited order, lawfulness and permanence, including the species uh uh plants, animals, and humans and the faculties necessary for their continued existence, all as a consequence uh all as um as a uh uh philosophical consequence of his view of the eternal universe, okay. Um but he denied uh Hajjgaha Pratis uh and held that whatever happens to the individuals of any species is entirely due to chance. Okay. Um and I just want to record this uh this example here. Okay, so the example is um is that wind blowing a particular leaf um uh is not the result of a uh of Hajjgara because we see no lawfulness and order in that particular. Okay, that's just example number one. Okay, uh actually we'll just see uh wind blowing a leaf or a stone uh you know uh falling down. Okay, and then example number two, and this is the this is the one that's gonna be critical, is um a ship, I guess, yeah, a ship sinking and killing sorry, individuals killed in a shipwreck uh or the collapse of a house are um are uh are totally sent this correctly. When individuals are killed in a shipwreck or the collapse of a house, um this is totally uh this is totally due to chance. And then example number three is there's no difference between a spider catching a fly or a lion killing a nubby. Okay, all are due entirely to chance. Okay, and and his reasoning is is fairly simple, which is that if you look at the the motions of the of the heavenly bodies, that is subject to a very clear order. If you look at the falling of a rock when you drop it, that is very clearly subject to order. That always happens. If you look at all species surviving through the same faculties that they were given, like spiders weaving webs and catching flies, that's subject to order. So that's that's clearly Hajgaha. But if you look at the fact that a uh a rock falls and crushes the brain of a scientist, or like some you know drunk uh boar, you know, falls and hits his head and dies, that doesn't seem to be subject to any sort of lawfulness that that cares about the particular qualities of those individuals. So that's what he means by chance. That there's not any sort of rhyme or reason to why this, you know, you know, this person died and this person didn't. I'll give you another example that, and I've given this example before, but you accidentally knock a vase off of a table, gravity will make it fall. You accidentally knock a baby off of a table, gravity will make it fall. Gravity is hard clawless, but gravity doesn't care that this is a human being and that this is a vase, you know. Or this has the potential to be telemalkim, and this is a uh this is just uh inanimate matter. So Aristotle says, yeah, that's all entirely due to chance. You know, it's just the law of nature playing itself out in a way that does not discriminate between individuals. Okay. Okay, last part of his view. In sum, the core of his view is this whatever he saw to be continuous, never undergoing corruption or any change in its course, such as the heavenly states or whatever proceeds in a fixed order and deviates from it only on rare and exceptional occasions, such as natural phenomena, all of this he says, uh, he says that it is governed, that is, divine providence accompanies it. But whatever he saw not to follow a regular pattern and not to adhere to a fixed order, such as the circumstances of the individual members of every species of plant, animal, and human being, whether rational creatures or irrational, of this he says that it occurs by chance, not through the governance of governor. That is, no divine providence accompanies it. He further holds that it is impossible for providence to accompany such matters, and this follows from his view of the eternity of the universe and his position that it is impossible for anything in this existence to be other than what it is. Those who departed from our Torah and held this view are the ones who said Hashem is abandoned the earth. So this is another important point here is that uh, in sum, Aristotle arrived at his view um from two causes. One, um, what he observed of the order and lawfulness uh in the universe, and two, um his uh his view that the universe is eternal and nothing can be other than what it is, um which therefore rules out you know, Hajjgaha Pratis, let's put it this way, Hajjgaha Pratis as intervention, right? Because that would mean that that the laws of nature can be suspended in some way or interfered with, and that he held it was was actually like impossible. Okay, that's Aristotle's view. Okay, we good? Okay, we're going a little bit over over time because I think we can finish the the the false views. Okay, I know we're losing people, but I'm gonna keep going. Okay, as long as there's uh as long as there's uh at least two people here. Okay, false view. Oh okay, false view number three is the Asharia, uh, which is a sect of Muslims. And apparently there are still Asharia around today, um, uh, which uh is not a uh not something you hear about. The third view is the opposite of this second view, and it is the view of those who hold that there is nothing in all of existence that occurs by chance at all, neither in particulars nor in universals, but rather everything is by will, intention, and governance. And it is clear that whatever is governed is also known. This is the view of the Asharia among the Muslims. This view entails enormous absurdities. Oh, let me just state this first. Okay, so so here they hold everything is Hajjgakha Pratis, okay, but in a more radical way than what people say nowadays. Everything is Hajjaka Pratis, stemming, you know, um uh in the sense that every single occurrence is directly caused by God's will, okay. And he says this view entails enormous absurdities which they have accepted and take upon themselves. Namely, they concede to Aristotle his view that the falling of a leaf and the death of a man are on equal footing. They say, Yes, that is so, but the wind did not blow by chance. Rather, God set it in motion, nor did the wind cause beliefs to fall, but rather each leaf fell by a decree and ordinance from God, and it was he who caused it to fall now in this place. It is impossible that the time of its falling could have been delayed or hastened, and impossible that it could have fallen anywhere other than before, uh than there, since all of this was decreed from eternity. Okay, so he says, however, they their view entails absurdities. Okay, so here are the absurdities. Number one um is that um that every uh you know when when the wind blows leaves off a tree, okay, um that's not actually happening. Okay, rather God is making the wind blow directly, and God is making each leaf fall directly. Um and so what what is really what really are they what does this belief amount to? Like why is the wrong calling this absurd?
SPEAKER_03There's no cause and effect at all in the universe, and therefore you can't understand anything because to understand something means to understand cause and effect zero.
SPEAKER_06Okay, good. So they deny uh Hajgacha claulis, okay, and all actual cause and effect. Okay, and then the second part you're saying about about uh denying knowledge that's gonna come next. Uh he says that explicitly, he says, um, according to this view, they are required to hold to hold that the motions and rests of all living things beings are decreed, and that man has no capacity whatsoever to do anything or to refrain from doing it. Okay, so they also they also deny free will because everything is directly caused by God. Okay. And it follows from this view as well that the nature of the possible is abolished in these matters, and that all such things are either necessary or impossible. Okay. Not copyright. They also deny the nature of the possible, okay, and hold that everything is either necessary or impossible. Now, again, we hold that there's three categories. We hold that there's things that are impossible, which I'm going to talk about on Sunday. Uh, thing then there are things that are necessary, like tupletus two equals four, and then there's possible, like I could pick up this pen or I could not pick up this pen. There's nothing compelling me to do either one, all right? Um, so they deny that. And then it also follows from this view um that the entire matter of the commandments is altogether of no use, since the man to whom every law was given has no capacity at all to do anything, neither to fulfill what he was commanded, nor to refrain from what he was forbidden. This sect says that he willed thus, that he should send prophets, command, forbid, threaten, promise, and warn, even though we have no capacity, uh, it is possible, on their view, that he may impose upon us what is impossible. It is possible that we may fulfill the commandments and yet be punished, or transgress it and yet be rewarded with good. It also follows from his view that his actions have no purpose whatsoever. Okay. So I don't know how you, okay, biased. I don't know how you want to um to classify these, but he is saying that um they they hold that um uh that there is no sense in commandments or prohibition, okay, and that there is there is no justice uh in God's actions, uh, and there is no purpose in God's actions. Okay, so in other words, um let's just um I think he's gonna summarize it for us. He says, Um, they have borne the burden of all these absurdities in order to preserve this view, so that when we see a person blind or maimed, all uh of whom we cannot say that there was a prior sin for which he deserved this, we say, Thus he willed. And when we see a righteous and devout man slain in agony, we say, Thus he willed, and there's no justice in this. For in their view, it is permissible with respect to him that he should torture, that he, God, should torture one who has not sinned and reward the sinner with good. Their statements on all these matters are well known. Okay, so in other words, um so in sum, in order to avoid the question of divine justice, when we see someone born, you know, uh with a disability, okay, they say um it's God's will, okay. Uh, and they are totally fine with the notion of a capricious uh deity. Okay, that God has no there's no justice in God's actions, it's just God doing stuff. Okay, that is their view. Yeah, Ayala.
SPEAKER_05Two things. One on the last point, don't they even go further to say there's not really such a thing as an evil or good person because they take away a choice?
SPEAKER_06Correct. Yeah, they are they're gonna end up denying good and evil for us as well. Yeah, hold on.
SPEAKER_05I thought and also is it possible to have um maybe this is just not them, but is it possible for somebody to say that everything is Hashgatha Pratis except for free will?
SPEAKER_06Yeah, so I think that is really what many Jews who follow the Hasidic uh opinion of the Bolsem Tov say. Now, whether they are actually able to hold that is a good question. Um, because I think if they're honest with themselves, uh they end up getting into absurdities like this as well. You know, like when I went on the Garden of Imuna rant, um, you know, Bitakon Shiram, you saw that the the that uh that guy, uh Rabbi Shlomo Arush, denies free will. He says that before you make a mistake, then you have to say that you had a parent free will, and then after you make the mistake, you have to say that God willed it. You know, so I think I think it it or I remember a um a um uh uh a high school teacher of mine who held by a view like this said everything is harshkaka practice, um, and everything is uh not okay. Well, we're gonna see in a little while. It's really more like the the fourth view. Everything is harshkaka practice, and everything is in line with justice. So, how do we explain it if I punch you in the face? Well, the way it works is I make a Bakir decision to throw a punch, and God knows that you deserve to get punched, and so he lines us up so that I end up punching you and everything works out, and everything is just. So I think if you really like like open the hood on that view, you end up getting to a denial of free will or denial of justice. Um, so you know, so I I do think people try to juggle a little, but you're right in in in uh consciously, the Jews who hold that everything is Hashka protis do say that free will exists, they do not say that God is unjust, uh, and they do not deny um good and bad. Yeah.
SPEAKER_05And this is a little off topic, but what does the Ramban hold in Al-Ragalahas, if it's possible to say?
SPEAKER_06Uh God willing, one day we'll learn through Eo of according to the Ramban. All right. Uh I I don't wanna I don't want to just speculate on on his entire thing. Okay, um, I can give you a paper if you're interested by uh David uh uh Professor uh David uh David Berger, uh who argues that the Ramban is much, much closer to the Ramam than people uh people think. But it might be better to read that after we do the Ramban uh and and get his views.
SPEAKER_05Okay, last is this sort of Ramban talks about this on Eov is where he talks about it.
SPEAKER_06Uh yeah, it's the the place where the the source in Eov, which you have to be careful of because there are editions that I think I that don't have the whole thing, is on um Lamedvov uh Pusak Zion, is where he he basically says that he fundamentally agrees with the Rambam. Um, and the reason why I remember that my mnemonic is uh I don't know if you've ever seen um Willy Wonkott in the Chocolate Factory, uh, but uh Gene uh Wilder's um uh uh statements, you lose. And that's what I always want to say to people when they claim that the Ramban and the Ramman fundamentally disagree, is I'm gonna say you lose, because if you look at Eov lose, Lamud Bob Zion, then he says, I agree with Raman, you know, um, but people are unaware of it because they don't learn the Rumban on Eov. Okay, so the mutazilah is the last group, which is another Islamic sect. In many ways, this is the most um subtle and non-intuitive of all the views, I think. Okay, he says the fourth view is that of those who hold that man has the capacity to act, and on this account, what is stated in the Torah of commandment, prohibition, reward, and punishment proceeds in their view in an orderly fashion. So the starting point, uh sorry, muta zila, is um they uh they hold by free will, okay, uh, and they hold that all of God's actions are consequent upon wisdom, and that just injustice is not possible for him, and that he does not punish one who acts well. Okay, they hold by free will, and that God's uh uh Hajgacha Pratis um is based on wisdom and justice, okay. Um uh and then he says the Mutazila also hold this view. Oh, so sorry, I I I jumped the gun. He didn't mention the Mutazila yet. Okay, so this is not entirely the Mutazila, but there are people who hold that man has free will, that everything is in line with justice, and that uh and that God does not punish someone who doesn't deserve it. Okay, and the Mutazila also hold this view, although in their view, man's capacity is not absolute. They likewise believe that he knows the falling of that leaf and the creeping of that ant, and that his providence extends over all that exists. Okay, so God Tajgacha Pratis is based on wisdom and justice and extends to all particulars in nature. Okay, he's gonna uh um to the point of absurdity. Uh okay, so uh I'll say what the absurdities are in a second. Um hold on. Okay, so what are the absurdities? He says this view entails absurdities and self-contradictions. The absurdity is this when some individual being human beings are born with defects, although they have not sinned, they say that this is a consequence of God's wisdom, and that it is better for this person so that he that he be so than he be sound, although we do not know wherein lies that benefit, and this is not by way of punishment to him, but by way of beneficence to him. Okay, so A is when they see people born uh with uh with defects, they say uh sorry with defects, um, which are which can't be the result um of their sins. Okay, they say uh that God did this for their own good. Okay. Uh likewise is their answer uh concerning the death of the righteous. They say that this is to increase his reward in the world in the world to come. Is okay, so likewise, when the righteous die, they say, I mean, die and and didn't deserve it, um uh they say that this is to increase their reward in the world to come. Uh they have been driven so far that when it is said to them, uh, why has he acted justly toward man and not toward others? For what sin has this was this animal slaughtered? They have brought themselves to the absurdity of saying that this too is better for the animal, so that God may reward it in the world to come, and that even the killing of a flea or a louse must necessarily entail a reward for it from God. And likewise, this innocent mouse devoured by the a cat or a hawk, they say that thus did his wisdom decree concerning this mouse that he will reward it in the world to come for what befell it. Okay. Um, this causes them to extend the doctrine of harjgacha, or I guess of reward and punishment, uh to individual animals. Okay, so that is their uh their absurdity here in the Ram. We'll talk about that again later on. So it's funny because this view is also uh a version of this is also held by certain Jews. So the the Hasidim who followed the Balshemto's view that everything is Hajjgacha Pratis, combined with the belief in reincarnation, okay, which again I hold is a non-Jewish view that crept into Judaism. You'll find Jews, and I'm not saying that these are scholars and thinkers, but you'll find like average Jews who do hold that, like, you know, God can punish you by reincarnating you into an animal, you know, uh, and therefore animals are part of this reward and punishment. Or they will say that if a person is uh, you know, baby is born with a defect, they'll say that it was a tikkun, that that it was reincarnated, and that that this is in line with justice, you know, and that this is for the good. Now, the the mutazila, he doesn't say that they hold by reincarnation, but I think that this is this is one of the ways that a bunch of Jews grapple with this problem, that they just dismiss the entire war and punishment, sorry, the entire problem of injustice by saying, oh, you know, uh everything is in line with justice, and this is either to reward you in the future or God knew that this is better for you. And it's like a bastardization of Gonzala Tova, you know, um, uh to answer these questions, to patch up these questions. Okay, last paragraph for today is a sort of summary. Uh, it's also a sort of uh Don Lakavzikus. Okay, so summary number, I'm gonna call it summary number one because the Raman's gonna summarize several times throughout the rest of the chapter. In my view, none of the holders of these views on providence is to be blamed. Okay, now I don't think he means they shouldn't be blamed because he holds that they have absurdities, but he means that that they were compelled. He says, since each of them was driven to what he said by a powerful necessity. Okay, so each of these views of Hajjgacha uh was driven by what the their uh adherents viewed as a necessity. Uh okay, so what are they? So Aristotle followed what appears from the nature of existence. Okay, so Aristotle based uh you know was was um was driven by what he saw of the order uh and disorder in the universe. Um now Ram doesn't say this here, but he said it earlier, and also based on his view of the eternity of the universe. Okay, those are the two things that are holding him to his view. Okay, the Asharia recoiled from ascribing to God ignorance of anything, for it is not admissible in their view to say that he knows this particular thing and is ignorant of that one. Okay, so the Asharia um were driven to their view, their view, by refusing to say that God is ignorant of any particular. Okay, and therefore they said that God is directly doing everything, which means that he's definitely not ignorant. Um, now you'll see it's a little bit more. I mean, it seems like it's a little bit more than just saying that God is ignorant, because they want us like, why don't they just say that God knows what's going on and doesn't do anything? It seems like they're also trying to avoid saying that God is unjust, uh, even though the Ram doesn't say that yet. Okay. And then the Mutazila likewise recoiled from ascribing to him injustice and wrongdoing. See, he says likewise, right? Um, so uh, and also their unwillingness to ascribe it's not really unwillingness, that's the thing. Also their their desire to avoid the problems of injustice. Okay, not to answer them. The mutazila, um, the mutazila likewise recoiled from ascribing to him injustice and wrongdoing, nor did it seem right to them to deny what is innate to the intellect by saying that there is no injustice in causing pain to one who has not sinned, nor did it seem right to them that the sending of all the prophets and the giving of the Torah should be without intelligible purpose. So they too took upon themselves what they took of those absurdities and were forced into self-contradictions, since they hold that he knows everything and man has the capacity to act, which leads, as is clear from the slightest reflection, to a contradiction. Okay, so that's like what I was mentioning before, the belief that everything is in line with justice and man has free will, uh, he says leads to a contradiction. So the Mutazila um were also driven, to their view, by concerns about God's uh by their refusal to ascribe injustice to God, um and their refusal to say that the Torah was given for no reason. Um sorry, yeah, yeah. Uh yeah, I think that that covers it. Okay, so he's saying that that that it's very similar to what we read in the last chapter, is that each of these was driven to their view of Hajgaha by unwillingness to say to reach certain other conclusions. Okay, um, but then the Roman adds uh but but the attempt to uh hold by absolute um uh uh omniscience and free will leads to a contradiction. Okay, and that's a good cliffhanger to end on. Okay, so that is the false views of divine knowledge in 316 and the false views of Hajj Gacha in uh in 317. Now he will go back and bring up those views again when he compares them to the true view. Uh, but next up is going to be his presentation of the mainstream Torah view, the later editions by the Goonim, and then the Ramam's own view. Okay, thanks for coming. So next week, no shir because it's Shabuos, and God willing, the week after that, we will continue. All right, take care, have a good job.
SPEAKER_05Have a good job. Bye.
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