Rambam on Divine Knowledge and Hashgachah (Part 2: True Views) Moreh 3:17b-18

Length: 1 hour 20 minutes
Synopsis: This morning (6/5/26), in our last Friday morning Sefer Iyov series for women of the season, we concluded the Rambam's INITIAL presentation of the true view of hashgachah, as understood from the Torah by the multitude of Sages, and as understood by the Rambam himself. Because we're going to be pausing our Iyov shiurim for the summer, I had to make it clear - in the shiur and in this synopsis - that what we covered in this shiur will NOT attempt to convey a complete picture of the Rambam's view. For that, we'll need to learn 3:19-21 on Divine knowledge, followed by his "commentary" on Sefer Iyov in 3:22-23, concluding with his final thoughts on hashgachah in 3:51. And for all of that, we'll have to wait until our shiurim resume in the fall. Treat the material we cover in this shiur as the foundation on which the edifice will (God willing) be built when we return.
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מקורות:
רמב"ם - מורה הנבוכים ג:יז-יח
David Guttman - "Divine Providence: Hopes, Goals, and Fears" https://hakirah.org/Vol%205%20Guttmann.pdf
רמב"ם - משנה תורה: ספר המדע, הלכות תשובה ט:א
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The Torah content for this month has been sponsored by Meir Areman, l'zeicher nishmas Zelda bas Ziesel, his grandmother, whose yahrzeit is on the 21st of Sivan.

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

All right. So this is part two of our uh mini-series within the EOV series. And this is on Rambam on Divine Knowledge and Hajjkaha. But first, an announcement, um, which is that the initial plan for this entire Maheshava lab series on EOV was that I am teaching or was teaching, I should say as past tense now. Yesterday was my last day of teaching EOV in high school. So um I was teaching my uh 10th, 11th, and 12th grade EOF classes at high school. And the original idea was like last year with Tefila, this shear was supposed to be like in tandem with that. But we had to rush the end of the year, and part of me wanted to say, like, okay, I got to rush and finish this also. And then it occurred to me, there's no need to rush. You know, the uh I had originally wanted to end them at the same time because I didn't want to continue into the summer, but then it just occurred to me that like we don't have to, we can do both. We don't have to continue into the summer, and we can continue this in the fall. So as of now, what I've decided to do is to wrap up uh not in a sense of finishing, but like like you know, um wrap up whatever what we're on right now, and then here's what it'll look like, which is right now we're doing the Torah's view of Hashaga and the Ramam's view, which is misleading as a title, because then he goes into uh in 319. Well, this is we're in we're in the middle of 317. So 317, second half is what we're doing today, plus 318. But then he goes into 319, 20, and 21, where he goes back to God's knowledge. Then finally in 322 and 323 is his quote unquote commentary on say for Eok. Okay. So rather than trying to rush that, I think what we'll do is we'll wrap up this initial presentation of Hashgakha, take summer break, and then when we come back, we'll we'll review what we did and then go into the final presentation of EOV. And this would allow this us, what this will allow us to do is to go at our leisure, to go more in depth than I did in high school, perhaps even to do other approaches to the end of EOV other than the Rambaum, and we'll go for as long as uh we're interested. Okay. Um, so that is that. And the only thing that is a slight risk, but I hope this doesn't happen, is I hope that I am still in the mood to do EOV when we come back. And I think I'm gonna feel like I have to because I don't want this current understanding that I have to just like slip away into the sands of time. And then once I start, then I'll get back into it again. Okay. So just in case I need a pep talk, then give me a pep talk when we come back. Okay, so let's do a review of what we did last time, uh, which was that um in 316, the Raman went through why people deny God's knowledge. And his thesis basically was that people are people are not denying God's knowledge after investigating the topic um like purely. Okay, what they're doing is they are confronting problems about a perceived lack of justice or hashgaha in the world, and then based on that, they end up denying God's knowledge as a solution, and then that misstep spawns different mistakes and philosophies about God's knowledge. All right, and that's why he says if people had gotten the Hajjgaha piece correctly, they would not have theorized about God's knowledge in the way that they did, and they wouldn't end up denying God's knowledge. So that was his uh approach in 316. Okay, then 317, uh, he goes and I'm just gonna read from our notes here, just uh refresh memories, because it's been a while, uh, nearly a month. Okay, so he says there are five views of Hajjgaha, or five views in relation to Hashgaka. The first one is not about Hashgatha, it is Epicurus who denies Hashgaha, and by denying Hajjgaha, it's not just Hashgakha Pratis, it's also Hashgakha clawless nature. And if that sounds crazy to you, it's because uh no one holds this now, okay? Not even scientists, right? He held that everything is just pure chance, and what looks like order and structure is really just an illusion. The closest thing to this is multiverse theory, which maintains that everything that can happen does happen, and and there are infinite universes, and in all these other universes, in many of these other universes, it's total chaotic matter. And this just happens to be one in which we have order, but it's it's not really anything intrinsic. It's just it's random. Like if you flip uh to borrow an analogy from Physics to God from Rabbi Fader and Rah Zimmer, I don't know if they still have this analogy, but like like imagine if you have a um a tray with a hundred coins and you you you you slam it down, so they're all gonna be on heads or tails, right? Now it's gonna be random. But let's say you did that infinite times, so there certainly would be one that would be all heads. Now, if you looked at that and that was the only one you saw, you'd be like, oh, look, there's order here, you know, like someone did this on purpose. But if you if it was infinite times and you saw that, you'd be like you would realize it's it's only apparent order. It just happens to be look like this, but it really is just as random as anything else. Okay, so that's Epicurus. Ramam does not talk about him anymore because he says Aristotle did away with him and no one holds that. Okay. False view number two is Aristotle. Stop me if you have questions, by the way, because this is uh uh again review from a while ago, and like certain things can come up that uh you know that we didn't see from before. Okay, so next view is Aristotle. Uh Aristotle affirms Hajgakha claulus but denies Hajgakha Pratus. Okay, how so? So basically, Aristotle arrived at his view based on what he observed, and he observed lawfulness and order in uh and permanence in certain aspects of the universe, like in the motions of the heavens and in the what he viewed as permanence of species and in the faculties of the species. So he said that that obviously has uh uh you know uh a I you can't say it's a designer, but it there's lawfulness there, okay, which is caused by God, not through creation, because he held by the eternal universe. But in other areas, like in human individuals and in animal individuals, there appears to be no order, okay. And therefore he said there's no Hajjgaha there, okay. And the example, uh the examples that the Ramam gives to illustrate Aristotle's uh view are number one, a wind blowing a particular leaf or a stone falling down is not the result of Hajjgaha, because we see no lawfulness and order in that particular. Example number two is when individuals are killed in a shipwreck or the collapse of a house, that's totally due to chance, according to Aristotle. And example number three, there's no difference between a spire catching a fly or a lion killing the navi. According to Aristotle, it's all chance because there's no there's no patterns there. So, in sum, um, Aristotle arrived at his view from two causes. One is what he observed in the order of uh and lawfulness in the universe, and then two, another point is Aristotle held that the universe is eternal, which meant that there is no way for anything to be other than what it is, and therefore he denies uh Hashgalatis, okay, which would seemingly involve an intervention in the order, the natural order. Okay. Next is the Asharia, which is a group of Muslim theologians. Uh, but the Ram says that their view was around in the time of Tanakh. Um, this is just the most modern packaging. So they held everything is harshgakhrates, but not just in the normal sense, uh, in the sense that there is no nature. Okay, everything is directly caused by God's will. I think the modern term for this is occasionalism, that every single instance is directly produced by God. And the Ram says that this entails uh numerous absurdities. Number one, uh, they have to deny any existence in nature. So it's not that the wind blows the tree and a leaf falls off, it's that God is making everything happen directly. There's no like lawfulness that is being operated there, okay, and there's no chachma in nature because it's just individual one-off, you know, instances. They also deny free will. They deny that God is directly making you do what you do. They deny the nature of the possible, okay, where we hold by three categories necessary, impossible, and possible. Possible is the realm of free will, and they deny that, okay. Uh, so they deny the cat the logical category of the possible. They also hold that there's no sense in commandments or prohibitions, that God can command you to do something that is impossible or or he can prohibit you from doing something and then reward you for violating it, or vice versa. They hold that there's no justice in God's actions and no purpose in God's actions. So all of this is to avoid the uh question of how can bad things happen to people that seem unjust. So, for example, someone is born with a defect, it's clearly not the result of their uh their their sins. So they they concoct this whole thing to say that like it's God's will and it you can't question God's will. It's just God doing stuff. Yeah, Ayala.

SPEAKER_02 8:32

It kind of eliminates the entire system of justice in general, right? Like justice isn't advanced.

SPEAKER_00 8:38

Yeah, yeah, no justice. And and seemingly, uh, I forgot if I mentioned this last time. One of my students asked me, what do they hold about human justice? You know, um, like uh I I don't know because they don't hold by free will. And like I just don't know, I don't know what they hold about uh by this. Uh, you know, okay, fine. All right. Uh and apparently I forgot if I said this last time. There is uh, I looked up whether there are any modern-day Asharia. Uh, and there's one guy at least who has a Wikipedia page with a photo, okay, who still seems to be active. So so apparently there are still people like this, but I did not look further into that. All right, false view number four, which is in many ways the most complicated and in also some ways the most similar to ours. So they hold by free will, they hold that God has Hashkaka Pratis based on wisdom and justice, and uh, and but they hold it extends to all particulars. So, for example, when they see someone born with a defect that's not the result of their sins, they say God is doing this, but they can't say God is doing it because the person deserves it. They're saying they'll say God is doing it to reward them in the future. Okay, so that's what we call the theory of compensation. Also, when the righteous die uh in a way that they didn't deserve, that's to reward them in the future. And most absurdly, they they extend the doctrine of reward and punishment to individual animals. All right, and they say that when uh you know a chicken gets slaughtered, God is going to reward it in the world to come. Okay, uh, so that is the mutazila. And then the Ramam summarizes it, he says that you in a certain way you can't blame them for these views because each was um dictated by what they uh they observed and what they felt was necessity. So Aristotle was driven by what he observed in the natural order and permanence of the universe, and where he didn't see that order, the Asharia were driven to say this because they didn't want to say that God doesn't know all the particulars, and to them, divine knowledge and hashgakha go hand in hand. So to say that God doesn't uh doesn't know it means that God is not mashgiah on it, or the other way around. And and in order to say that God knows it, then they must say that God has Hashgakah on it. And then the mutazila also didn't want to ascribe injustice to God. Um, and so they wanted to say that God knows everything, but things are fair, so it's fair in the sense that God is gonna compensate you. Okay, and that is the end of our what we did last time. Okay. Any other questions? Okay, so now I'm gonna go ahead because we're gonna break for the summer after this, then I'm gonna I'm gonna tip uh my hand here or the Ramam's hand, okay. He starts off by saying like this the fifth view is ours, that is the view of our Torah. I shall now inform you of what is stated in the books of the prophets of our prophets concerning it, which is what the multitude of our sages believe. I shall then inform you of what some of the latter-day scholars among us have believed, and I shall also inform you of what I myself believe in this matter. Okay, so this is the Ramam's uh plan, okay. Uh Ramam's plan to present the view of uh this is I'm gonna put this in ABC. So present the view of the Torah as understood by the multitude uh of sage multitude of sages, okay. Uh B uh sorry, I'm gonna say to present. Okay, the view of the Torah, B, the view of latter-day scholars, which are what we will call um the Goonim, okay, because that was those are the people who came before the Ramam. Okay, and C um is Rambam's view. Okay, now here is the um uh the spoiler alert slash disclaimer slash warning. Okay, so spoiler, let's say disclaimer, okay. Later in 323, Rambam will reveal that that that what he's calling uh the Torah's view here is partially what the Torah actually teaches, okay, but partially the way it is understood um by those whom the Rambam considers wrong. Now, it is clear even here that he is saying that because he he's differentiating between the Torah's view and his view, right? So, like if you take that seriously, you're like, wait a minute, Ramam's disagreeing with the Torah. Obviously, he's not disagreeing with the Torah, but he's he's presenting a view of the Torah as one would get it from the sources, and he's gonna give a nuanced, philosophically enlightened view of that later on in 323 uh in the fall. Okay, so just know that what he says is the Torah. Don't take this as uh gospel, okay? That this is the Torah as it seems, okay, but uh he's gonna have to uh enlighten us later. All right. Um, so he continues. He says, like, oops, hold on. Okay, so he starts off with the unanimous points. Okay, so he's gonna start off, oops, sorry. Yeah, okay. He's gonna start off with unanimous points, okay? Everyone agrees to two things. All right. One, he says, I say a foundational principle of the Torah of Mocha, our teacher, peace be upon him, and of all those who follow it, is that man has absolute capacity. That is, by nature, oh, sorry, by his nature, his choice and his will, he does whatever it is in the power of man to do without any newly created thing being produced for him at all. So too, all the species of animals move by their own will, and thus he willed it, that is, from his eternal will, which never began, that every living being moved about by its will, and that man should have capacity over whatever he wills or chooses among the things he's able to do. This is a foundational principle, the contrary of which has never, thank God, been heard within our nation, okay, until uh until Rabbi Shalom Arush wrote the Garden of Imuna. Okay, um, so he says so so uh foundational principle number one is man has free will. Okay. Um and uh and um yeah, just say man has free will. Okay, now when you first read this, it looks like he's saying something funny about animals. What what does it look like? I don't know if any of you thought this. What does it look like he's saying about animals?

SPEAKER_04 14:42

That they're free will also.

SPEAKER_00 14:44

Yeah, it sounds like he's saying animals are free will also, right? But what is he actually saying? When he says animals move by their own will. And every living being should move by its own will. Yeah, tomorrow.

SPEAKER_03 14:57

Um I would think it means that like they have some sort of in in internal, I guess maybe maybe it's in contrast to being a direct act of God. I'm not sure, but that there's some internal mechanism in the animal that's the cause of it moving.

SPEAKER_00 15:09

Okay, correct. Yeah, yeah. So this is something that that was the ancients uh uh held by that we don't really think about anymore, which is that they they you know they split things into roughly four categories. There's man, animal, plant, and mineral or metal. Okay, right. So metal is roughly corresponding to what we would consider to be inorganic matter. Plant is a lower level of organism that grows but doesn't move by its own volition. Okay. Um, like, and don't ask me about Venus flytraps because something, something, something like stimulus response, but it's not like, or don't ask me about plants growing in the um in the direction of the sun. I I think like just from a I don't know like exactly where to draw the line, but from a common sense perspective, there is a big difference between a dog getting up and then running over to see who's at the door versus versus a Venus flytrap automatically closing when when the chemicals or the thing detects like a fly in it. Okay, so um, so and if you think about it, the word animal, what's the shoreish? You don't have to say what the Latin or the Greek shorish is, but like the shoresh of animal is related to another word that has to do with motion, namely animated, yeah, animated, right? So animal, animate, and animus, right? All these are movement terms, okay, right? Um, so man is free will, just as animals move, I'm gonna put this in in parentheses, non-free by their own volition, okay, as opposed to plants, um, so too, man moves freely by his own volition. Okay, so so man, and yeah, and I'm not gonna go into the whole discourse on free will here, but like one of the big differences is animals only have one trajectory uh in terms of how they grow and develop. So, and then they can't really operate outside of that. Whereas a uh a person can be a tzadik or a Russia, you know, and or can express his free will in so many different ways. Okay, so that is um that is uh free will there. Okay. Next foundational principle that everyone agrees with is likewise among the foundational principles of the Torah of Moshe, our teacher, is that injustice is in no way possible for him, for God, and that all the afflictions that befall human beings or the goods that come to them, whether to a single individual or to a community, all of this is by way of judgment, in accordance with what is fitting by the just verdict in which there is no justice whatsoever. Okay, even if even if a person is pierced by a thorn in his hand and removes it at once, this came upon him by way of punishment. And even if he attained the slightest pleasure, this is a reward for him. All of this is by judgment, as he says, for all his ways are judgment. Uh Kikodor Khav Mishpat, though we are ignorant of the modes of that judgment. So this is foundational principle number two, which is that everything that happens to human beings um is in accordance with divine justice, and there is no justice whatsoever. Okay. And then he added, okay, even um I'm just gonna make this as a specific here, okay, is this specific I guess, or the the um not the limits, not the parameters, extent, right? The extent is even uh a uh uh being pierced by even even the smallest pain of being pierced by a I'm gonna say splinter, okay, or um the slightest pleasure is all in accordance uh in accordance with divine justice. Okay, now when you read this, it is very tempting to say, oh, so the Ram's saying that if you if you get a splinter, then that's Hashgalka Pratis. No, no, Ram has not even talked about Hashgalka Pratis yet, okay? He's saying it's in line with justice, and what that means, there's a lot to be understood about what that means. But but in other words, there's nothing that happens that's not in line with justice for human beings, as opposed to Aristotle, who held that it's total chance. Okay, so those are the points that I remember. Say again? Okay.

SPEAKER_02 19:15

Did you mean sorry, there is no injustice whatsoever?

SPEAKER_00 19:18

Oh, yeah, sorry, no injustice. Thank you. No injustice whatsoever, big big, big difference. Okay, um, yeah. Okay, so now he goes through another little summary. Uh, and I think this one has a slightly different uh emphasis. These views have now been laid out to you. Whatever you observe in the varying conditions of human individuals, okay, so summary of of how different uh uh schools view different uh individuals, okay. So he summarizes like this Aristotle holds it to be entirely by chance, okay. Uh what happens to individuals is chance. The Asharia holds that it follows from will alone. Okay. I'm not gonna say what happens to individuals, okay, due to chance, due to due to divine will. Okay. Uh the mutazilah, oh sorry, sorry, um, yeah, the mutazila hold it is from wisdom. Mutazila hold that it is from wisdom. Um, and we hold that it follows from what the human being deserves according to his deeds, due to justice in accordance uh with our deeds. Hence, according to the Asherite, it is possible that God may afflict the good and pious man in this world and place him eternally in that fire which they say exists in the world to come, saying simply, thus he willed it. The Mutazalite considers this an injustice and holds that whomever has been struck with pain, even an ant, as I mentioned to you, has compass compensation, and that his being so struck and made to suffer in order to receive compensation follows from God's wisdom. We, however, believe that all these human conditions are according to what is deserved, that he, far be it from him to do injustice, punishes none except the one who deserves punishment. This is what the Torah of our teacher of Moses, our teacher, has stated. Everything follows what is deserved. So I'm just going to add to those four views here, or not four of them, but the Asharia holds they oops sorry. Asharia holds that according to divine will, uh, even uh and and uh and there is is no justice, God can even condemn a righteous person to hellfire, eternal hellfire, um uh uh without uh you know uh based on on his will. Okay, the mutazilah say it's due to wisdom that even an ant that suffers is compensated in accordance not with justice but with God's special plan of compensation uh for that ant, compensation package. Okay, and we hold that it's due to justice in accordance with their deeds. And how did he reiterate that here? Is that that um uh if a person suffers it is only uh it is in accordance with justice. Yeah, Ayala.

SPEAKER_02 22:13

Is it possible to elaborate more on the difference between wisdom to zoom as and justice? Like if they're saying they're compensated, isn't that like some kind of justice?

SPEAKER_00 22:23

Yeah, so it is interesting throughout these entire chapters, the Ramam wave not waivers, he he goes back and forth between the dichotomy of will and wisdom. Like if you remember we saw with the purpose of the universe, he says um that you know ultimately you're gonna have to say it's God's will, or if you prefer God's wisdom, you know, but then here he's talking about justice, and it of the two, it sounds like justice is either synonymous with wisdom or is a um a subcategory within wisdom. For now, the only thing I can say is that wisdom would also include compensation that is disconnected from reward and punishment. Meaning, meaning, if God has a special like, you know, way of relating to people who are righteous and to distribute reward, you wouldn't call that arbitrary will, but you also wouldn't call it uh call it justice. Okay, but justice is predicated on wisdom. I'm just gonna write that out, okay, just as uh as uh to clarify here. Clarification question Okay, what is the difference between uh wisdom and justice? So the answer is that that um uh wisdom is more all-encompassing. Uh for example, if uh the the mutazilah told that God relates I guess God God will meet out suffering in order to increase reward, okay. Um this is not an arbitrary will, nor is it justice in accordance with uh with actions. Okay, however, we hold that it is just this that it is justice, it is it is only justice, and that justice is predicated on wisdom. Does that clarify? I'm not saying exactly what the scope of their view of wisdom is, but I'm I'm just trying to show the relation between the two.

SPEAKER_02 24:25

Yeah, I think so. Do you have a quick working definition of justice?

SPEAKER_00 24:30

No. The only thing I I would say is that is what the Ram is, which is it's according to what is deserved by your actions. So this is not justice in the sense of like there's justice in the sense of um just lawfulness, and then there's justice in the sense of of um getting what you deserve. Okay, and this is getting what you deserve. Uh uh as I I can't say more than that for now. Okay, so a lot of this next part of the chapter, by the way, is the Ram just gonna be substantiating his views. So I'm not gonna dwell on these. Um especially, I don't even think the Raman wants us to dwell on these because he's gonna give his theory of Eof later on. Okay, so he's just showing you evidence for his claim about the sages. In accordance with this view, follow the words of the multitude of our sages whom you find saying explicitly, there is no death without sin and no suffering without transgression. Okay, that shows that everything that they hold. So, according to the Mutazilah, there is death without sin if you're gonna get compensated. There is suffering without transgression if you're gonna get compensated. According to us, there is not. And they said, Okay, this is a uh a phrase that you know, but not from the quote, because the quote is too cumbersome. Bemidish adam mo uhish adam moded bat modidin. By the measure with which a person measures, so is it measured out to him. The way people say this is Mida Kenegid Midah. Okay, but the phrase that that comes from is this phrase, bemidish adam moded bot modedin lo or something like that. All right. Uh, that's the Mishnah and Sota. They've explicitly stated in every place that justice is necessarily required of God, may he be exalted, namely that he rewards the upright for all the deeds of kindness and rectitude that he performs, even if he was not commanded to do them through a prophet, and that he punishes every evil that a man does, even if he was not warned against it through a prophet, since he is warned against it by natural disposition. I mean the prohibition against oppression and and justice in injustice. So this is an important point here. Okay, so uh first he says, actually, I'm gonna summarize um the first part. So um sorry, hold on a second. Hazal attest to the primacy of justice in many places, okay. And by justice, they do not mean exclusively halaha, okay. Um God also punishes people uh for doing injustices that were they they were not warned about from a nubby. Now, what examples come to your mind of that? I think there are two major examples where God punishes people for doing injustice and it was not warned about through a nubby. And they're both in braces.

SPEAKER_02 27:16

What's coming to manifest is kai and killing.

SPEAKER_00 27:19

Did you say kyne? Yeah, that's a third example. Okay, that's good. Yeah, okay, that that is another good example. Yeah, that's not what I was thinking of. Yeah, tomorrow.

SPEAKER_04 27:28

Uh Dorha Mambu and Dorha Flagga.

SPEAKER_00 27:30

Exactly. So the generation of the flood, uh, they were punished because they should not have engaged in uh, you know, whatever their their sin was, you know, vodazara arrios, but certainly Gazelle, and then uh and then Sedoma. Oh, sorry, oh sorry, I said the wrong thing. Dorha Fluga, I think that's up to dispute because it's not even clear that that was a punishment. Um, that's a whole other sheer, but uh Sodom and Amora. For some reason, when you said I registered Sdom and Amora, but they also were not warned by a prophet, but they were they were uh doing things that were unjust and they got destroyed. Okay, so you see from there that it's not just like a religious law, it's that there is God cares about human justice in uh in in in beyond beyond uh uh Navua. Okay. Um they said, Kazal said, the Holy One blesses he does not withhold the reward of any creature. So that shows not just punishment but reward. Uh, and they said, Whoever says this is a funny one, whoever says that a car who uh is lax, may his bowels become lax. Okay. Um, uh, and so that's showing lax here, meaning that like God like lets things slide. So let your bowels slide. Okay. Um rather he is uh long suffering. I think erchapayim uh is the word, but he exact what is his. In other words, God does not give immediate justice because erchapiim is one of his mitos, that he gives us time to do chuva, but at the end of the day, justice is coming. Okay. Uh, and they said he who's commanded and acts is not like one who acts without being commanded, making clear that even one who is not commanded is given his reward. All their words proceed upon this principle. Okay, so in other words, um I'll just tack this onto here as well, which is that likewise, likewise, he rewards uh those who are doing good even if they weren't commanded. Okay, uh so that shows that it's not just tied to religious law. Okay, again, none of the point is not to dwell on this. These are just the Ramam, uh there's just the Ramam substantiating that his claim about Hazal is borne out in the text. In the words of the sages, there is one addition. Okay, so I said before, he's gonna present the view of the Torah, then the view of the latter-day Gonim, then his own view. Okay, so this right here was Torah. Okay, but now we get to the G'onim. He says G'onim. Uh, in the words of the sages. Oh, sorry. Okay. In the words of the sages, there's one addition. Okay, maybe this is not okay. Well, I'll read it anyway. In the word of the sages, there is one addition not found in the language of the Torah, namely the statement of some of them concerning Yesurin shall Ava, afflictions of love. According to this view, it is possible for afflictions to come upon a person not on account of any prior transgression, but in order to increase his reward. This is also the doctrine of the Mutazilah, and there is no verse in the Torah for this matter. Do not be misled by matters of trial, of a Nision, of a test. God tested Avraham and he afflicted you and made you hunger, for you will hear about these later in 324, which is one chapter beyond Eok. All right, so just um is uh I'm gonna just say like uh um minority views, okay, is um Yisurin Shell Ava, okay, uh, which is afflictions of love, um uh is a doctrine held by some sages, okay, um shared with the mutazilah, uh, but not attested to in any sukkim. All right. B, our Torah has not addressed itself at all to the conditions of human individuals, sorry, except to the conditions of human individuals, individuals. As for the matter of recompense to animals, it has never been heard among our nation in earlier times, and none of the sages of the Talmud mentioned it at all. Rather, when when one of the later day Gaonim of Blessed Memory heard it from the Mutazila, it seemed right in his eyes and he attempted his view. Okay, so um compensation to or recompense, I guess, recompense to animals, okay, which uh which is a mutazilite view that was adapted by some Gonim. Okay, I I've read that this is a criticism of Saad Yu Gaon, okay, but I have not seen that inside. Uh I haven't even seen the Ramam say that. Um, but he's, you know, uh obviously he respects the Gonim, but he disagrees here. Okay, so that is his his presentation of the Torah's view in quotation marks because uh obviously he holds that his view is the Torah's view, but this is how the Torah is either uh this is like this is the unanimous set of facts that the Torah is working with that Ramam's view is going to be an understanding of. Okay, any questions on this? Okay, Ramam's view. So first an introduction. As for what I myself uh believe concerning this principle, namely divine providence, I it is what I shall now describe to you. In the belief I shall describe, I do not rely on what demonstration has led me to, but rather on what has become clear to me in the intent, uh clear to me the intent of the book of God and the books of our prophets. This view, which I hold has fewer incongruities or difficulties than the views that preceded uh and is closer to rational reasoning. Okay, so I want to read the yeah, what do you what do you get from that preface? It's weird. He like stops and like justifies himself. What is he saying that his view is or is not based on?

SPEAKER_02 33:01

Yeah, I'll clear him. It seems like he's saying it's through the MSora and what he what he understood from the Torah and the sources rather than just like his own rational proofs and demonstrations.

SPEAKER_00 33:14

Okay, very interesting that he does say from the the Psukim, but he does not say the MSora, right? Now, you would think that he's relying on the Mysora because you just quoted all the statements from Hazal, but he he does not, he says, okay, we'll let's put it this way on what has been clear to him from the to be the intent of the book of God and the books of our prophets. He again he could have very easily said, and the teachings of our sages, but he doesn't. Just noting that, okay. Uh, anyone else have any observations on this part here? Yeah, bigo.

SPEAKER_05 33:45

I find it interesting that he says it does not rely on what demonstration has led him.

SPEAKER_00 33:50

Like, is that is that like lived experience or demonstration is uh being used here in the sense of proof. Okay, so I'm actually gonna read an uh an interpretation of this paragraph from my favorite essay on Hajjgaha protests. Okay. Um, this is by David Gutman. It is in one of the early issues of Kakira. You can get it for free at people. Should know, by the way, about Hakira.org. Kakira is the flatbush journal of Jewish Law and Thought. All of their articles uh are free except the most current volume. And then once the new volume comes out, then they add it here. So many interesting articles on so many interesting topics. Like I just printed out for Shabbos, or I'm printing out for Shabbos here. Uh a very timely article. Uh, you can't see it on the screen, or maybe you can see it. The Bal Shemtov's expanded view of Hashkaka Pratis. You know, he has here, um, what else caught my eye? Uh Ramblem's authenticity, no idea what that is about. Non-medical use of Adderall, halakhic considerations. And these are all English, rigorous, uh, academic, but Torah-based like like articles, all very interesting. The order to close a Vulcan Yeshiva and expel Tiroshi Yeshiva. So I just like every once in a while I remember, oh, Hakira exists. And then I just like print out a bunch of articles or or or get the uh the physical copies. So very good. So this essay, I want to say this. The author does not make this claim. I want to say that this essay was written with Ruha Kodesh. Okay, that's how much I would praise it because it is written in a way where every time I read it, basically it's a walkthrough of what I've walked you through. Not even everything, it's a walkthrough of, well, actually, it kind of is a walkthrough of the Morith 3.8 through 318. Okay, not so much the actual E of actually, no, he does E of also. It's a walkthrough, and like every time I read it, I'm like, he's just stating the facts and presenting them in a way that gets me one level more of understanding. And then I read it again a couple years later, I'm like, whoa, he was he was saying that the whole time, and I get this other layer of insight. And then every time I read it, it's like it's divulging more and more and more, but it is an incredible essay. All right. So he starts it off by quoting um that uh passage in the Rambam. Okay, I'm just gonna read his translation just so we know where it's coming from here. My opinion on this principle of divine providence, I will now explain to you. In the principle which I now proceed to expound, I do not rely on the conclusion to which demonstration has led me, but on what clearly has clearly appeared as the intention of the book of God and the writings of our prophets. The principle which I accept contains fewer incongruities and is nearer to intellectual reasoning than the opinions mentioned before. So now Gutman explains. We learn from these statements that the issue of divine providence contains inherent conflicts between the literal text of Tanakh, possible interpretations of that text, and rational thought. We also learn that providence is not an empirically provable concept, but rather an ontological view of our daily life based on revelation. Without revelation, the writings of our prophets, we would come to different conclusions about providence. Okay, as illustrated by who? Chiefly, who was basing their view of providence totally based on uh empirical empiricism? Yeah, tomorrow. Aristotle. Aristotle, okay, right? So Aristotle did not have access to divine revelation. So he was engaged in a good study, but he didn't have all the data. And it's not just that he was lacking data quantitatively, it's that the Raman was saying fundamentally, this is not the type of thing that that rests exclusively on empirical evidence. It'd be similar to if a person tried to arrive at conclusions in the field of history based purely on philosophy. You can't do that. Like there is there is an empirical basis to it. Um, and so so you have to like have the right standards of proof uh and and argument for your subject. So the subject matter of of of Hashgh, in other words, Aristotle viewed Hajjgakha as a division of natural philosophy of science. We don't regard it that way. We we view it as, I mean, he's saying an ontological uh um, what do you call it? I I'm just blanking on oh, an ontological view of our daily life based on revelation, all right. So he says, uh the challenge is to accommodate our independent conclusions with those of the uh uh the prophets teach us. Ramam proposes to do that and believes his approach is the best. We, however, get the message that the most we can expect is that it will, quote, contain fewer incongruities and is nearer to intellectual reasoning, but ultimately the two will never be 100% in accord. However, the Ramam sees divine providence as the most fundamental concept in Judaism. I never know how to pronounce this. It sounds you I think the way it is actually pronounced, it sounds like it is not correct. Rhizon Detra, I think you say tetra, doesn't sound like real French, okay, of all the laws and rituals of the Torah, the ultimate religious experience. Okay, so I find this really interesting here that if Gutman's reading is correct, then you should not expect to have your views of Hajjgaha Pratis fully sit well in every regard. There will still be difficulties. This is not, for example, like physics, where you really are or math, where you really are trying to get 100% cohesion of your theory and the facts. Okay. Why that's the case is a very good question, which I don't know the answer to, but I think it's a good reading of the Rambah. Okay. All right. Having said that, he says like this. Uh so he's gonna he's gonna be very blunt. Now remember, I just gotta stress this, okay? We are in 317 and 318. Okay, that's the Raman presenting his view of Hajjgaha, you know, and and if you just stop there, you'd be like, oh, this is what the Ramam holds. But then he goes on for five more chapters, and by the end, in other words, if if 318 17 and 18 were the sum total of the Ramam's views, why would he go on? And he introduces so many more ideas in these other chapters. Okay, so do not end here today thinking that you know what the Ramam's view is. End it thinking if the Ramam was presenting his view alongside the other views, this is like the the formulaic def uh definition of the Rama, but this is not us understanding what the Rama means. The understanding will come from the the later chapters. Okay, so this would be like in treat it as like a formula type definition. Okay, so he says like this Um, I am of the opinion that divine providence in the lower world that is beneath the sphere of the moon. So remember that in uh medieval cosmology, um, you have the different celestial spheres and the lunar sphere, um everything beyond the lunar sphere was unchanging celestial bodies made of the quintessence, and everything beneath the lower lunar sphere is the world of coming to be and passing away. So everything beneath the sphere of the moon, uh the sorry, the divine providence in the lower world extends only to the individuals of the human species. This species alone is the one of which all the conditions of its individuals, the good and the evil that befall them, follow what is deserved, as he says, for all of his way to their justice. But as for the rest of the animals, and all the more so the plants and the other living things, my view is that of Aristotle. I do not believe at all that this leaf fell because of providence over it, nor that this spatter devoured this fly by a decree of God and his particular will at this moment, nor that the spittle which Ruving spat until it uh fell upon this gnat in a particular place and killed it by judgment and decree, nor that this fish, when it caught this worm from the surface of the water, did so by a divine will directed at this particular. Rather, all of this is, in my opinion, entirely by chances Aristotle holds. Okay, so this is pillar number one, okay, is this uh Ram's view, is Ram Bam's view. Okay, so um uh everything that that happens to human individuals uh sorry, no, uh I should start this from from Hajgaha, okay. Hajjgaha pretis extends only to human individuals. Okay, but the individuals of other species um uh are left to chance like Aristotle. Okay, um oh sorry, I should say human individuals uh based on what they deserve, okay, uh like the Torah, but the individuals of other species are left to chance like Aristotle. So if you stop here, it sounds like he's just doing a hybrid that it's half Aristotle and then half Torah. Okay, but he goes on. Um Divine Providence, in my view, and as it appears to me, follows from divine emanation. Now, this is one of the reasons why I need to uh take a break and during the summer educate myself about this theory of divine emanation. Okay. Um, I don't know about you, but when I hear the term divine emanation, I think, oh, that's what the Kabbalists hold. Okay, like God emanated the the universe. That's not how the way that the Ramam uses it, even if there are similarities. Um, and uh in I don't know if any how many of you heard uh Professor Goodman's uh YBT Sunday shear, but he spoke about emanation as well. It has to do with um, like if I had to insert a word here, uh actually I did this in the translation, intellectual emanation. This has to do with how existing things um in the world that are physical come from God. Okay, and it has something to do with the Ram's theory of divine knowledge, but I cannot speak to it at all. So I'm just gonna flag it and be like, hopefully by the time I we return to this in the fall, then I'll understand it uh enough to teach it. So divine providence follows from divine emanation. So I'm just gonna flag that here, okay? Hajjgalka Pratis um follows from divine, uh divine emanation. Okay, and the species to which that intellectual emanation has attached itself so that it becomes possessed of intellect, and there was disclosed to it whatever is disclosed to a possessor of intellect, that is the species to which divine providence has attached itself, weighing all its actions by way of reward and punishment. Okay. very cryptic but apparently very important sentence here all right that um so i'm gonna say like this okay um divine hashkopha process follows from divine em uh divine i'm gonna put in brackets intellectual uh emanation okay and um and it is is inherently connected with uh the the species on earth that possesses intellect okay and all actions are weighed in reward and punishment um through that intellectual emanation okay question what does this mean answer i don't know yet okay but this is what he's saying i i i i uh I and I feel like I definitely need to know this in order to really you know get the Ramum okay now this gets very perplexing okay let me refresh your memory about Aristotle's example Aristotle had said when individuals are killed in a shipwreck or the collapse of a house this is totally due to chance if that's Aristotle now watch what the Ramam does uh as for the founding of a ship and all those in it as has been mentioned and the falling of a roof on those in the house if this was by way of sheer chance the entry of these people into that ship and the sitting of the others in that house was in our view not by chance but but by divine will in accordance with what is deserved by his judgments the rule of which our intellects do not attain to know what is he saying here I'm gonna virtually just repeat what he said okay because I think this is confusing.

SPEAKER_04 46:10

Yes Mark I was gonna try yeah go ahead okay I would think he's saying that there are particular by chance but um the eventual way that it affects the person is gonna in some way be influenced by God.

SPEAKER_00 46:27

Yeah okay that that's good that's a good summary here okay so so I'm gonna just take one step stronger here okay which is that that if and I'm putting a big weight on if okay if the collapse of the roof or the shipping the the sinking of the ship is due to chance the entry of the people into the ship or the house is due to divine will in accordance with with what those people deserve which our intellects cannot attain to know. Again I'm I'm virtually just summarizing the Ramam here. Okay so we're gonna this is gonna have to be a test case okay that we come back to so like what does what does the Rambaum mean? How does this work? Okay TBD okay I do not think we're gonna be able to understand that until we um until we get into actually 322 and 323 okay but we're just flagging it as an example here. See, you know the the the the devil is in the details and I don't mean that the satan is in the details even though the satan is also in the details um but the um the devil is in the details with Hoshkakhokratis you can have a theory of Hoshkakh Pratis that sounds good as a theory but then when you apply it to the particulars it forces you to be more exacting and uh and and this when the Ramam tells you about a particular case we have to mind that for all it's worth okay now what led me to this belief is that I have not found in all the language of any prophetic book that God that mentions God's having providence over an individual of any of the animals but only over individuals of mankind. Now I'm actually gonna just tell you here we're gonna kind of rush through this part because the Ram kind of goes on a discourse about sukim that seem like God has hashgaka on animals really do not does not mean that. So if we wanted to get all the ideas we would understand each case the Ram gives us but as far as I'm concerned the Ramam is just trying to show you that don't think that God has Hajjgaka practise on animals. All right so we're gonna kind of take this part really fast. Um so I'll just summarize that here is that that um there is nothing in the prophetic books to indicate that God has Hajjakha over sorry Hajj gacha over particular animals okay um and I'll summarize okay so he says like this the prophets even expressed wonder that there of there being providence over the individuals of mankind saying that man is too low for him to oversee let alone animals other than man so in other words man himself they can barely you know barely seems like we deserve Hajjgaka so how are you gonna say animals do? He said Lord what is man that you should even know him what is man that you are mindful of him and explicit verses have been stated concerning providence over all individuals of mankind and the accounting of all their deeds he said he fashions their hearts together he understands all their deeds and he said whose eyes are open on all the ways of the sons of men to render to every man according to his ways and he said further for his eyes are upon the ways of man and he sees all his goings. The Torah too has stated providence over individuals of mankind and the accounting of their deeds he said and on the day of my visitation I will visit upon them their sin. And he said whoever sinned against me I will blot him out from my book and he said I will destroy that soul and he said I will set my face against that man and many such passages and all that has been related concerning Avram Yeskah and Yaku was complete proof of individual providence. Okay so um I'm gonna say this here okay what what we do and don't get from Tanakh okay so we don't get anything about God having over animals we get there is Hashgaka over human individuals uh in accordance uh with their their desserts okay what they deserve okay uh so that is those proof texts um then he says but for the rest of the individuals of the animals the matter concerning them is undoubtedly as Aristotle holds for this reason their slaughter has been permitted and even commanded and we are permitted to use them for our needs as we wish the proof that the rest of the animals are not under providence except in the manner of providence that Aristotle mentioned is what the prophet said when he saw the dominance of Nibukanetar and his great slaughter of human beings. He said, O Lord, it is as if human beings have been abandoned and forsaken made into ownerless creatures like the fish and the creeping things of the earth indicating by this statement that those species are abandoned. This is what he says in Havakuk 1, 14 through 15 and you have made man like the fish of the sea, like the creeping things that have no ruler over them. He brings them all up with a hook. So in other words if God has had Hajjgakha protests on animals and if the Nubhi is trying to express God's seeming lack of Hajjak on humans he wouldn't say you made them like the fish of the sea. What do you mean you made them having Hajjkakha protests? No clearly the fish of the sea are not under protection and the Kabakuk is expressing astonishment that it seems like God is treating man like the fish. Then the prophet made clear that the matter is not so and that it is not by way of abandonment and the removal of providence but rather by way of punishment to them since they were deserving of what befell them he said O Lord you've appointed them for judgment oh and O rock you have established them for chastisement. Okay so I'm just gonna add here I'm gonna add to the animal column this is why it is permissible to kill and use animals uh if we need to okay um because they are not under Hajjakah practice uh which is interesting by the way because that seems to indicate that that the immorality of killing is tied to Hajjakha which is not how I think of it. Okay but yeah do not think that this view is contradicted by his saying he gives to the beast its food into hillam or he's saying the young lions roar after their prey and they seek their food from God or he's saying you open your hand and satisfy the desire of every living thing uh nor by the statement of the sages he sits and feeds them all from the horns of the wild oxen to the eggs of lice and many similar expressions you will find. So notice oh look there are psyching that have that that talk about God feeding the animals. Doesn't that prove Hajjgaka Pradesh? No he says there's nothing in them that contradicts this view of mine for all these refer to providence over the species not over the individual. It is as if he were describing his acts of grace may he be exalted and providing for each species its necessary food and the substance of its continuance. This is plain and clear. Aristotle too holds that this kind of providence necessarily exists and Alexander of Aphrodisius has likewise mentioned this in the name of Aristotle namely the provision of the existence of food for every species for its individuals for were it not so the species would undoubtedly perish and this is plain upon a little reflection. So that's another another point which is that any uh that seem to indicate uh pratis over animals is actually talking about hashgaha qualis um for the the sake of the preservation of their species okay and even Aristotle holds by this Hajjgaha okay so don't think that God is actually uh you know dishing out food based on on the reward and punishment here like the Mutazila would all right uh as for their statement the suffering of animals Sarbalihaim is a Torah prohibition based on the view why have you struck your donkey this is by way of bringing us to perfection so that we should not acquire the trait of cruelty nor cause pain pointlessly without benefit but rather should incline toward compassion and mercy even toward whatever whichever animal happens to be at hand except in a time of need when your soul desires to eat meat not that we should slaughter by way of cruelty or sport. Okay so that's sarbalekim uh is sorry is is not prohibited because um because animals are under hashgal but as a safeguard against us developing cruelty. Okay and and I wrote about that in my article about why you should be uh polite to uh to ChatGPT okay um that even though it doesn't have I mean Ram has different explanation but but it's it's for your sake not for the sake of of of uh of of the thing nor does it follow on this view that I must answer the question someone put may put to me why did he exercise providence over the individuals of mankind and not exercise providence over the rest of the individuals of the animal species? Okay, right? It's unfair says answer for it is fitting that the one who poses this question first ask himself why did God give intellect to man and not give it to the rest of the human species the answer to this latter question is thus he willed it or thus is wisdom required or thus nature required according to the three preceding views. And by these same answers this first first question is answered. So the question is why doesn't God extend Hajjgapratis uh to and to individual animals okay so Raman basically says this is this is equivalent since since Hajjgapratis is a function of the intellect okay because of divine overflow or emanation I mean divine emanation um this question is really asking why didn't God endow animals with intellect okay and the answer to that is such was God's will his wisdom or nature okay that's like 313 you can't ask why did God create man with intellect and not animals that's a why question about the universe uh and you can't know final causes about about that. Okay we're almost at the end of the chapter and then we'll we have one more chapter left understand my view to its end. I do not hold that anything is hidden from him may he be exalted nor do I attribute any incapacity to him rather I hold that providence follows the intellect and is bound up with it. For providence can only come from one possessed of intellect and from one who is an intellect of complete perfection beyond which there is no perfection. Accordingly whoever has had something of that emanation attached him will be reached by providence in proportion to what has reached him of intellect. Now this is going to be the theme of the next chapter um this in my view uh is the view that in my opinion accords with both intelligible and the text of Torah so this is his summary here which is um so summary is um um I'm gonna add this here despite holding that that the non-human individuals are not under Hajjapratis know all particulars and nothing is hidden from him okay I'm ceding this is ceding a point for chapters 19 20 and 21 okay um uh the summer the sum of the matter is that since uh Hajjgaha comes from um a the the from he who is perfect in intellect and reaches us via our intellects okay we receive Hajjga in proportion to our intellects okay again he's gonna deal that's gonna be the main point of the next chapter all right but as for those preceding views they contain either excess or deficiency. The excess leads to utter confusion the denial of what is intelligible and resistance to what is perceived by the senses. As for the deficiency a grave deficiency it entails the very evil beliefs concerning God and the corruption of the order of human existence and the obliteration of all the virtues of man both moral and rational I refer to the view of one who removes providence from the individuals of mankind and equates them with the individuals of the rest of the animal species. So that is Brahm saying then is um is I guess the uh where his view lies okay is between the two extremes okay the the Asharia and mutazilah who embrace a uh who embrace a uh a Hajgakapratis uh that um that involves um absurdities and uh and you know uh uh obliteration of morality okay um for man and god um uh and the extreme of Aristotle and you could add an epicurus who hold that uh who who uh who hold that that man is no different uh from the animals okay and that is the end of the first presentation of the Rama on Hashgaka uh but we will swiftly follow this up with the next chapter which is much shorter any questions on this so far other than what does he mean and what does he hold about Hashgaha I'm just gonna set up a new thing.

SPEAKER_01 58:54

Okay.

SPEAKER_00 58:58

Okay so let's start with 318. Again this is not very long show you how long it is here. Okay yeah all right so he says like this um after I have set forth concerning sorry after what I've set forth concerning providence singling out the human species among alone among all the living beings I say it is already known that no species exists outside of the mind rather the species and other universals are mental notions as you know um and everything that actually exists outside the mind is only an individual or individuals so in other words species is a is is a is a human construct okay and in reality you have individual animals you don't have an actually existing thing called species okay and we understand this even more than the Ram because they held they did not know about in uh evolution we know about evolution and there is a continuum among all the species either in time or in individuals okay so species um is is a mental construct uh in reality there there only exists individuals okay once this is known it is known that the divine overflow that is bound to the human species I mean human intellect is nothing other than what exists as individual intellects namely what has been bestowed uh overflowed upon Ruven Shimon and Levi okay so therefore sorry therefore once we say that Hajgacha Pratis flows from uh or I guess uh sorry um is uh is via the uh divine overflow which is the divine emanation okay um uh we must say that it relates individually to to individual intellects because that's all that exists okay in other words um there is no you know Hajjakha practis on the human species as an entity okay because that doesn't exist in reality okay there's only individual intellects based on what you know okay what based on what what each individual knows. All right onward this being so it follows necessarily in accordance with what I stated in the preceding chapter that whichever individual among human beings has obtained a greater portion of that overflow in proportion to the readiness of his matter in his training providence over him will of necessity be greater granted that providence is consequent upon the intellect as I have mentioned. Divine providence therefore is not present in equal measure over all the individuals of the human species rather they have grades of providence over one another concerning uh corresponding to their grades of human perfection okay so that is a major point in the Ramam's view um uh which uh you know I I've shown this before and I I uh I made a Hajjgakha project chart this chart is of the the view of all the Rishonim which is why I put it in generic terms um whereas the Ram has more specific terms so on the chart on the x-axis you have uh on the the left side of the x-axis you have distant from Hashem uh which I list here as lacking in intellectual perfection ethical perfection and observance of halacha and then on the far right you have close to Hashem um possessing intellectual perfection ethical perfection and observance of halacha and then on the y-axis at the bottom you have life governed by Hashgal Khalis and at the top you have uh life governed by Hashgal Pratis, Hashem's laws of personal supervision and you have a diagonal line going up showing that Hashgal Pratis increases in proportion to one's closeness to Hashem. So the way that the Raman would say this is distance from and closeness to he would say is intellectual perfection okay which we'll define a little bit more clearly in a second. So so bottom line here is that um whoever has a more perfected intellect will receive a greater will receive more Hajjgaka Pratis in proportion in accordance with what he receives from the divine overflow okay in proportion to the readiness of his matter and training okay uh which I'm not explaining deliberately right now. Okay. So the the main idea here is that it's proportionate and again he did say that at the end of 17 but now he's saying it very specifically and in other words up until he says this you might think to yourself oh so everything that happens to human beings who have intellect is Hashgal Kha Pratis and he's saying no no no even within human intellects it goes there's there's gradations. So he says according to this view it necessarily follows that his providence over the prophets is exceedingly great and proportionate to their ranks and prophecy and that his providence over the pious the chasidim and the righteous the tzadikim is proportionate to their piety and righteousness for it is that measure of overflow of the divine intellect that causes the prophets to speak set straight the deeds of the righteous and brought to perfection the knowledge of the pious in what they knew yes tomorrow this question is going back a little bit yeah um was on the species argument I don't know I just find this like a strange um a strange reason to make this point like meaning I think that what he's saying doesn't seem dependent on this comment about species and also the comment on species should apply more broadly yeah I do hear that I one thing I don't know is whether he's talking against a different view of Hajjgaha so for example um and I'm gonna speculate here because I think the example is good and I might be wrong you'll you'll find people talking about there's a special Hajjaka on Kla Israel. Okay I think a lot of us think that way right but that's not how the Ram talks about it because there is no entity of Klay Israel that that the Hajj relates to there's individual minds within Klaisrael now being part of Klaisra and having the Torah and having access to Navua there might be other dynamics that contribute to you you know being in a better position to get Hajjgakha but there's no such thing as Hajjga on a collective there's just Hajjgakha on individuals. Whereas there is Hajjgaka on a collective in terms of natural laws or in terms of like like animals. For example, you know an animal or at least the way the Rama thinks about it, all of the faculties that animals have for their survival and uh perpetuation of their species is Hajjgha claw us. And that is on a species wide level like like it's built into the way that forms come into matter and stuff like that. I mean and I I don't know exactly how he conceived a species but he might be just talking about that point of like anytime you talk about Hajjga, you have to talk about the human, the individual human mind I'm gonna pause this and give an example of this. That's hold on a second. I don't know if that answers your question.

SPEAKER_04 1:05:50

Okay yeah thank you I'll I'll think about a little more okay and again I don't fully understand it either.

SPEAKER_00 1:05:55

Okay. And for all I know it could stem from some Aristotelian premise that Um that we that he's just not articulating. Okay. But here we have here we have a claim and a problem. Okay, so he says like this. Um accordingly, the greatest Hashgakha uh is on the prophets in proportion to their prophecy and over the chasidim and sadikim in proportion to their uh chesed and sedek. Now, if you if you just stop there, what would be the major question or problem that you have? And and to me, it it's a problem or question that that strikes me as the Rahman is just throwing a curveball here. He does answer it in what we read, but like if you just had that claim here, what doesn't fit about this? Yeah, Vega?

SPEAKER_05 1:06:50

Wouldn't this mean that they have better lives and therefore like you know aren't as troubled?

SPEAKER_00 1:06:58

Okay, well then that that's gonna be a problem in general about why why people suffer. But I'm I'm talking about a problem with the actual uh in um a problem of the integrity of the Ramam's theory as a theory. Yeah, Ayala.

SPEAKER_02 1:07:11

Seems like until now he's more talking about like intellectual perfection.

SPEAKER_00 1:07:14

Now he switches their class and so the question is wait, what uh until now Rambam said that Hajjgaha Pratis only cares about intellect, but now he seems to be bringing uh you know action, uh I guess like a you know deeds or character into the picture, right? Uh you know, by by saying that Sadiqim and Hasidim ha uh are are under a higher level of Hajjgara as well. Okay, so he did answer that in the next sentence.

SPEAKER_01 1:07:53

So so how is he answering that?

SPEAKER_00 1:08:10

It is that measure of the overflow of the divine intellect that caused the prophets to speak, set straight the deeds of the righteous and brought to perfection the knowledge of the pious and what they know.

SPEAKER_01 1:08:21

So, what is he saying?

SPEAKER_02 1:08:28

Yeah, I'll is he saying that their level of intellectual perfection made them worthy of the seed that has brought into this level of Hasidim.

SPEAKER_00 1:08:36

Yeah, yeah, I I I I I would say it slightly differently, and I don't think we're saying different things, but uh the way I would say it is like this is Ramam is being consistent, okay, um the reason why Sadiqim and Chasidim uh merit a higher level of Hajjgakha is because their Sedek and Chesed are inherently related to their intellect. Okay. Uh in other words, and this is a difference, I think, between the Ramam and other people, um, it's not the act, the acts of tsedek and chesed per se that merit Hajgacha, Hajjgaha Prates. Um uh rather it is the intellect, the intellectual perfection that is the cause of those acts, and perhaps the result of those acts that um that that uh is responsible for that higher level. And for this reason, I think this is why you can have cases where Avramavinu does not actually sacrifice his son, but his his the level he reached in making that decision is what merits him a higher level of process. Or as I've heard Rapeso uh explain in the Zikronos, the Musaf of Roshanash here with the Zikronos, that that you know God can reward us for actions that we didn't actually do in real life because we would do them if we had an opportunity, you know. Um uh and so I I don't want to go too too far into that. But what he's the main point here is that I think there is a school of thought that says that that mitzvah actions get you. We're sorry, we're not talking about skar and owners here. That get you hashka protis. Ramam is saying it's is that that Sedik and Khesed are a function of intellectual perfection. Okay, and so I just want to show you in the Ramam also, the closest place in the Ramam where it sounds like he is saying this is in um I think it's Chuva 9. Where is it? Yeah, he says, Oh, this is in 9 1. Uh uh eighthaim, God uh gave us a Torah, this Torah, as a tree of life, and anyone who does everything written in it and knows it with a complete and firm knowledge merits through it life in the world to come. According to the magnitude of his actions and the magnitude of his chachma, he merits. Okay, so my understanding of the mechanism of that is it's not doing the action per se. It's that the action has to be related to your Salem Elohim, to your Seychel. And again, whether it is a two-way street or just a one-way street, that the action is stemming from your sechel or contributes to your sechel, that's what he means. Uh, and and according to my my understanding, the Ramam does not have a mechanism by which something physical can result in any Hajjgal practice. Hajjkah protest is purely through the intellect. So even your physical stuff, if that's gonna have any correlation with your uh Hajjgal practice, it's it's it has to be by the intellect. Okay. How that works is is remains to be seen. Okay. Uh I'll I'll write that just to be uh to be uh to be cheeky. Okay. Um how wait, sorry. How does this work? Okay, TBD. Okay. As for the ignorant who rebel, in proportion to what they lack of that overflow, their standing has been brought low and they've been ranked together with the rest of the individuals of the other species of living beings. Uh, he is like the silenced beasts. For this reason, it has been made a light matter to put them, meaning the wicked, to death, and we've been commanded to do so for the sake of the benefit it brings. So again, this is the second time he's mentioned this, is the reason why we we you know uh can, in certain circumstances, uh kill the wicked is because they lack that connection to Hajjgaka, to Hajjgakha Pratis via the divine overflow and are therefore like animals. So again, he's connecting the the morality of of killing living things to Hajgakh Pradesh. He said you can kill animals for your needs because they are not under Hajjgakha Pratis, and the wicked you can also kill for the needs of society, um, again, within parameters, uh, because uh they're not connected to Hajjgakh Pradesh, they're like animals. All right, this matter is one of the foundations of the Torah upon which it is built. I mean the principle that providence over each and every human individual is in proportion to what accrues to him. Consider how scripture speaks explicitly of providence over the particular circumstances of the patriarchs in their occupations and even in their possessions, and of what they were promised by way of providence accompanying them. To Avram, it was said, I'm a shield to you. To Yitzhak, I will be with you and bless you. To Yaakov, behold, I am with you and will guard you wherever you go. And to the master of the prophets, Moshe, for I will be with you. And to Yahushua, as I was with Moshe, so I will be with you. All of these are explicit statements that providence over them was in proportion to their perfection. Okay, and by the way, this is the top five list of the greatest Hashgalchapratus individuals. Okay, Avrim Yatkah, Yaakov, Moshe, and Yoshua, who's the surprise one. And then in chapter 51, the Ramam adds Aaronriam. Okay, so the top seven, you want to know top seven Hajjgakh Pratis uh uh records of all time, the those are they. Okay, I'm not aware of any place where the Ramam says uh there are people who are in that that level. Okay, almost at the end of the chapter. And it is said concerning providence over the pious and the abandonment of the ignorant, he guards the feet of his pious ones, but the wicked are silenced in darkness, for not by strength does a man prevail. This verse means that the deliverance of some human beings from afflictions and the falling of others into them is not according to their bodily powers and natural endowments. This is the meaning of for not by strength does a man prevail, but rather according to perfection and deficiency, that is their nearness or remoteness to God. Um, for these for this reason, I'm just gonna say what the Ram is doing here, okay, is Ramam brings many proofs from Tanakh to the effect that Hajjgaha Pratis uh is proportionate uh to a person's um uh perfection. Okay, um, yeah, uh for this reason those who are near him are utterly protected, he guards the feet of his pious ones, whereas those who are far from him are abandoned to whatever befalls them, with nothing to shield them from what may occur, like one walking in darkness, whose uh whose ruin is assured. And it is also said concerning providence over the pious, he guards all his bones, the eyes of Hashem are upon the righteous, he shall call me and I shall answer him. Uh, the text spoken on this matter, uh, I mean concerning providence over the individual human beings in proportion to their perfection are too many to count. Okay, so I'll just summarize here is that uh uh those who are close to God, to Hashem, are protected, and those who are distant are abandoned to chance. All right. Is this the last paragraph? No, two more paragraphs, I think. Oh, three more. Okay, sorry about this. Hold on. Okay, last part. Um the philosophers too have noted this matter. Abu Nasser al-Farabi said in the introduction to his commentary on Aristotle's Nicmacchian ethics: those who have the capacity to transfer themselves from one moral quality to another, these are the ones of whom Plato said that God's providence over them is greater. Why he needs to put Al-Farabi and Plato, I don't know. Um, consider how this mode of inquiry has led us to the recognition of the truth of what all the prophets have stated concerning the individual providence proper to each and every individual in proportion to his perfection, and how this follows necessarily from the side of philosophical speculation. Granted, that providence is consequent upon the intellect, as we have said, it cannot be maintained that providence is over species and not over individuals, as has become well known among some of the schools of philosophers. See, I know tomorrow's not on anymore, but tomorrow I think that's what um he's talking about. He's he made that point against certain philosophers who did hold that Hushga is on species, and that's why the Ram has to say there's no such thing as species, there's just individuals. And if Hajkha is going based on individual intellect, there's only Hajjkah with individual intellects. So he says, um, again, uh, as has been known to some of the schools of philosophers, since outside the mind there exists nothing but individuals, and it is to these individuals that the divine intellect is bound. Providence then is precisely over these individuals. Reflect upon this chapter as it deserves to be reflected upon, and through it all the foundations of the Torah will become clear to you, complete for you. They will be in accord with you for you with speculative philosophic opinions, the absurdities will be removed, and the form of providence, how it is, will become clear to you. After what we we have mentioned of the views of the people and specul of speculation concerning the prop uh providence and the manner of God's governance of the world, I shall summarize for you also the view of the people of our nation concerning divine knowledge and what I have to say on the matter. So again, if you if you were um Ramam student, um uh um blanking on his name, Yehuda Bin Yehuda, I forgot what his name is, then and and you're getting these in the form of letters, you'd be like, oh, the Ram is done talking about Hajjgaha now. Now we're just gonna talk about divine knowledge, but no, the Ramam goes back and then goes to Hajjgaha in uh in EO. So we are not complete. That's why we have much more to understand. But now the the big takeaway from this, from all of this today, is according to the I'm gonna summarize this at the bottom here, is um bottom line. Rambam holds that that um that uh uh only human beings receive Hajjgha, Hajgaha Pratis, uh, because Hajjgaha Pratis operates via the intellect, okay um and that Hajjgaha Pratis is in accordance with their intellectual perfection, okay, and I'm gonna call this the the term I coined for my students is is truth-seeking and truth living, okay, meaning um from uh you know tsedek and chesed, okay. Um in accordance with intellectual perfection uh based on what they deserve. Okay, uh whereas the all individuals of other species uh including the wicked among the human species are left to chance, i.e. Hashgalclawless. And that is the end of our this year's series on EOV to be continued, God willing, after the summer. Okay. It's been a pleasure, and I'm already excited to go even deeper into EOV than uh uh with you guys than I did with my students uh this year in high school. So stay tuned. Uh thank you for coming and have a good Shabbos and a good summer.

SPEAKER_02 1:19:33

Thank you so much.

SPEAKER_00 1:19:34

All right, thank you.