Eikev: All You Need is Fear

Synopsis: This is the audio version of the 5-page article I wrote and published on rabbischneeweiss.substack.com/ on 7/31/26 titled: Eikev: All You Need is Fear. According to R. Chanina, Moshe tells us that Hashem asks only fear of us, and only fear is in our hands. But the pesukim list far more. The Torah Temimah and the Rambam provide opposite solutions.

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The Torah content for the month of Av is sponsored by Aliza Feder in honor of the yahrzeit of her mother, Mindy Pincus a”h. I had the pleasure of getting to know Mindy during my first year of yeshiva. She and her husband Gersh hosted me so often that she told me I could assume that a place would automatically be set at their table every Friday night. I will always remember her as a living embodiment of chesed and hachnasas orchim.

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:08

Hello, I'm Rabbi Matt Sneweiss, and this is the audio version of the five-page article I wrote and published on my Substack at rabbi Shnewice.substack.com on july 31st, 2026. And the article is titled Akiv, All You Need Is Fear. Only Ura? Really? Among the many highly quotable statements Moshe Rubinu makes throughout Seifra Divarim is the following quote, from Devarim 10, 12 through 13. And now, Israel, what does Hashem your God ask of you? Only to fear Hashem your God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve Hashem your God with all your heart and with all your soul, to keep Hashem's mitzvahs and his statutes that I command you this day for your good. End quote. Rubichanina in Brachos 33b, noting Moshe's use of the phrase only, offers this Drasha, exegetical explanation. Quote, Hakol bide shemaim chutz mi yeuras shemim, everything is in the hands of heaven except for fear of heaven, as it is stated. And now, Israel, what does Hashem your God ask of you? Only to fear Hashem, your God. Period, end quote. The Gemara continues with other statements of Rabbi Khanina on Yura, which I hope to write about someday. I'm sure I've quoted Rabbi Khanina's statement dozens of times, but only this year was I struck by a question on his reading. Why single out Yura when the Psukim go on to list many other things that God asks of us? Imagine you're on your way to the grocery store. You get a text. Can you pick something up for me? You respond, sure, what can I get you? The reply comes back, I only need a carton of milk, a dozen eggs, some onions, a pint of ice cream, and the best ribeye steak you can find. Would it make sense to summarize their request by saying they only want a carton of milk? Of course not. Similarly, it's very nice for Rabbi Khanina to give a drusha on Moshe's use of the phrase only, but how can he ignore everything else on the list? Thankfully, I'm not the only one bothered by this question. The Torah T Mima and the Ramam offer explanations of Rabbi Khanina's statement that answer it in different and arguably opposite ways. The Torah T Mima's minimalist reading of Ura. Not only does the Torah T Mima raise and answer our exact question, but he maintains that this is precisely what Rubi Khanina intends to address. He writes at the beginning of his analysis in Devarim 1012 Note 12, quote, Hakobideshimaim, etc. This means to say that the choice to fear Hashem is given over to the person himself. Regarding the rationale of the proof from this Pasuk, it would seem that Rubi Khanina made his statement because it is impossible to explain in accordance with its plain meaning that Hakadish Barakhu demands from man only to fear him and nothing more. Doesn't this Pasuk itself explain many more things that Hakurish Barakhu demands? To walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve him, to keep his mittos and statutes? And in truth, many things are demanded of a person who fears Hashem, to turn away from all evil, to do good, to bestow kindness, to do justice and righteousness, to walk humbly, etc., and so on. Hakadrash Barakhu certainly demands all these things from the perfected person who fears and serves him. If so, what is this that Moshe said that Hakadrash Barakh demands only to fear him, given that great that many great matters cling to the heels of fear? End quote. This is an expanded version of our question. How can Yura be the only thing Hashem demands when a, Moshe goes on to list other demands, and B, one who fears Hashem will need to do even more things that Moshe doesn't mention at all. The Tort Mima then elucidates Rubichanina's statement. Quote, and therefore Rubi Khanina expounds that because this Mida trait of Yura is only in the hands of heav of the person and his will. Let me start that again. And therefore Rubichanina expounds that because this Mita of Yirah is only in the hands of the person and his will, and through it his keeping of the mitzvos and the midos traits emerge and branch off, therefore Hakarish Barakhu demands only this from him. But the other acquisitions and perfections are in the hands of heaven, and he, God, bequeaths them to the person who fears him. And such is the intent of the expression, to walk in all his ways, etc. That is to say, all these are the tahlis of the era. Tahlis here meaning end, culmination, or outcome. All these are the tahlis of the era, and in truth they come about through assistance from Hakarish Barakhu, as it is said in Yuma 39A, or as it actually is, Yuma 38B, Habalataher Mesainoso. One who comes to purify himself is assisted. End quote. The Tortamima then briefly addresses the next statement of Rubichanina in the Gumara before returning to recap his analysis. Quote, according to what we have written, that everything enumerated in this verse does not refer to Hashem's demand for man, and rather they are explained as the tahis that comes from the one who fears Hashem, then Hakar Barakul in truth demands only Yura alone, and with the rest of the things he will be assisted from heaven. End quote. According to the Tortamima, Rubichanina's claim is that the Mida of Yurah, or the choice to fear Hashem, as the Tort Mima puts it, is the only thing in our hands. Everything else in the Pasuk, including Shemiras and Mitzvos, the observance of the commandments, isn't what Hashem is asking of us at all. These are the Tahlis of Yura, they branch off from it and are bequeathed by God with his assistance to those who fear him. In short, Moshe can say that Hashem asks only Jura of us because Yura is the only thing given over to our choice. The Rambam's maximalist reading of Jura. The Rambam's understanding of Rubi Khanina's statement differs markedly from the Tortamimas. His primary exposition can be found in Shmonaprachim chapter eight, quote. But the expression found in the words of the sages, namely their statement, everything is in the hands of heaven except for fear of heaven, this is true and accords with what we have mentioned, but many people err in it, and they think, regardless of man's sorry, and they think regarding some of man's volitional actions that he is compelled in them, such as a man being paired with a certain woman, or this money being in his hand. End quote. The errors to which the Raman refers are reinforced by various statements of the Ghazal, implying that matches are made in heaven, such as the one in Sota 2a, quote, Rivihudd said in the name of Rav, forty days before the formation of a child, a Baskol, heavenly voice, goes forth and proclaims, the daughter of so-and-so is for so-and-so, the house of so-and-so is for so-and-so, the field of so-and-so is for so-and-so, end quote. The problem with reading such statements literally is simple, as the Ramam explains. Quote, this is not true, for regarding this woman, if taking her in marriage was with a ksubah, a marriage contract, and kidushin, halakhic betrothal, and she is permitted to him, and he married her to be fruitful and multiply, then this is a mitzvah, and Hashem will not decree the doing of a mitzvah. And if there was a blemish in her marriage, then this is a transgression, and Hashem will not decree a transgression. Likewise, this person who robbed so-and-so's money, or stole it, or acted faithlessly with a deposit and denied and swore to him about his money, if we say that Hashem decreed upon this one that this money should come to his possession and leave from the possession of this other one, then we are saying that he, Hashem, has already decreed a transgression, but the matter is not so. End quote. Brahman here doesn't doesn't spell out why he finds it objectionable that Hashem would decree the doing of a mitzvah or a transgression, because he writes at length about this earlier in the chapter. Here is the most relevant excerpt, quote. And if man were compelled in his actions, then the Torah's command and prohibition would be nullified, and all of this would be absolutely for naught, since the choice is not in man's hand as to what he will do. And reward and punishment would also be absolute injustice, whether from us to one another or from Hashem to us. For this Shimon who killed Ruvain, if Shimon was coerced and compelled to kill, and Ruvain was coerced and compelled to be killed, then why should he why should we punish Shimon? And furthermore, how is it possible to say of him, exalted is he, righteous and upright is he? Devarim 32, 4. And that he should punish him for an act that he is compelled to do in any event, and if he wanted to, he could not. And if he wanted not to do it, he could not. End quote. This is the premise of the Ramam's arguments here. If Hashem compelled our actions, then the Torah's commandments and prohibitions would be irrational, and reward and punishment would be unjust. And since a particular man marrying a particular woman is within the realm of mitzvah and a vera, we cannot accept a literal reading of any statement of Khazal implying divine interference. Having stated his objections to these erroneous readings, the Ramam interprets Rubikanina's statement, quote, Rather, all of man's volitional actions, in them without a doubt are found obedience and rebellion. For we have already explained in the second chapter that Torah command and prohibition are only in actions in which a person has choice whether he will do them or not. And this is the part of the soul in which Ures Shamaim will be, and it is not in the hands of heaven, but is given over to the choice of man, as we explained. If so, by their statement everything, they intend only the natural matters over which a person has no choice, such as his being tall or short, or the falling of rain or drought, or the corruption of the air or its healthfulness, and other things like this from all that is in the world, except for the movements of man and his rests. End quote. He then provides solid scriptural support for his view from the words of Yermia in Echa, quote. But as for this matter, which the sages explained, that obedience and rebellion are not by his decree, by Hashem's decree, nor by his desire, but rather by man's volition, in this they were following the language of Yermia, namely his statement in Echa 338, From the mouth of the Most High the bad things and the good things do not come forth. For bad things in this context are the bad actions, and good the good actions. And he said that Hashem will not decree that a person do the bad actions, nor that he do the good actions. End quote. Therefore, a person is rewarded if he follows a good path and punished if he follows a bad path. All human actions are included in the fear of heaven. For every single action eventuates in either a mitzvah or an aveira. When the rabbis of blessed memory said everything is in the hands of heaven, they were referring to the way of the world and its nature, such as the species of trees, animals, souls, intellects, spheres, and angels. All of them are in the hands of heaven. The Ramam's reading is clear, but will become clearer if we compare and contrast it with the Torah T Mimas. The Torah T Mima versus the Ramah. According to the Torah Tmimah, Yira, in the context of Rubi Bukhanina's statement, is a particular Mida. It is the only Mida entirely in our hands. The other qualities and virtues mentioned by Moshe, walking in Hashem's ways, loving him, serving him, keeping his mithos, as well as the many others he doesn't mention, turning from evil, doing good, bestowing kindness, doing justice and righteousness, walking humbly, etc., are not in our hands, but in the hands of heaven. He reads Ribikanina's statement, he reads Ribikanina's everything as maximal and his Yerashimaim as minimal. In contrast, the Ramam regards Yira as a stand-in for the complete realm of human freedom and agency. He reads Rubichanina's statement, Yurashimaim, sorry, he reads Rubi Khanina's Yurashimaim maximally. All quote, all human actions are included in the fear of heaven, for every single action eventuates in either a mitzvah or an avera, end quote. Rubichanina's everything refers to physics, i.e. the laws of nature, including man's physical makeup, his being tall or short, but doesn't touch upon anything in the realm of morality, the good and bad things, Yermiya was referring to when he said from the mouth of the Most High, the bad things and the good things do not come forth. Consider, for example, Ava Zashem, love of God. The Torah commands each of us to, quote, love Hashem your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your resources, end quote, from Devarim 6.5. The Rambam in Hilvashuva 10.2 writes about one who serves God out of love, quote, this is an exceedingly great level, and not every Chachem, wise person, merits it. It is the level of Avraham Avinu, whom Hakarish Barak who called my beloved, end quote. How would Rubi Khanina speak about Avas Hashem according to the Torah Temimah and the Rambam? The Torah Tamima understands Rubi Khanina Khanina to mean that the only choice we really have is whether to fear Hashem. Of those who cultivate that Mida of Yirah, some will attain the high level of Avas Hashem and others will not. The results are not in our hands. How far we get depends entirely on divine assistance. The Ramam, however, places Avas Hashem squarely within the category of things within our control. While he certainly wouldn't deny that each of us is given predispositions, as he writes about at length in the same chapter of Shmonaprakim, and that the Torah and its mitzvos will not be able to perfect every person in every way due to the inherent limitations of physicality, see the More 334, he would balk at the suggestion that Ava Sashem is not in our hands. This same oklochus extends to all other Mitos, perfections, and attainments. This includes Shmir's Hamitsvos, which is not only listed in the Parsha, but which the Torah Tamima reiterates in his own enumeration. This, more than any of the other particulars enumerated in the Takhlit Safira, the Ramam would find objectionable. The Torah Tamima and the Ramam also differ in how they interpret the Pasuk in our Parsha. Neither would accept the grocery run difficulty from the beginning of our article, but each would reframe the analogy differently. The Ramam would reframe it as, I only need groceries, colon, milk, eggs, onions, ice cream, and a ribeye. The Tortamima would reframe it as, I only need a ride to the store and I'll get the rest myself. Lastly, note that the Torah T Mima is focused on resolving a textual problem. The Psukim lists more than Yura, so Rubichanina's proof seems difficult. The Ramam, on the other hand, is addressing a philosophical problem. People mistakenly take Rubi Khanina's statement to constitute a denial of free will. Both problems are real. The question is which one dictates how we read Rubi Khanina's statement? This brings us to the Ramam's advice. The Ramam's methodological advice. After explaining Rubi Khanina's statement to Avadia Hagar, the Ramam offers some methodological guidance for how to interpret statements of Khazal that seem to contradict the fundamental principles of Torah. Quote: Anyone who neglects these matters, which we have explained and which are built upon the foundations of the world and goes and searches in one of the agadic, non-legalistic statements or midrashim, or in the words of one of the Geonim, until he finds one word with which to object to our words, which are words of knowledge and understanding, is only committing suicide, and it is enough for him what he has done to his own soul. Rather, the following is the proper approach for a person of understanding whose heart is set to take the path of truth, namely, that he should make the matter which is explicitly stated in the Torah into a fundamental principle and foundation, and should not demolish a building and fur uh and a firmly driven peg which does not falter. When he finds a verse from the prophets or a statement of the rabbis of blessed memory which disputes this fundamental principle and contradicts this idea, he should seek and search with his mind's eye until he understands the words of that prophet or that wise man. If their words come out in line with the idea stated explicitly in the Torah, then it is good. And if not, he should say, I don't know what the meaning of the prophet uh of that prophet's words or the words of that wise man. They must have had a hidden meaning and were not intended literally. End quote. Free will is one of the few principles that the Ramam refers to in the Mishnah Torah, Hilast Shuva 5.3, as an Icker Godal, major principle. To take an agatic statement like Rubi Khanina's, which seems to undermine an iker-gadal, and to make it into its own iker is to commit intellectual suicide. Instead, we should treat the ikarium as ikarium and interpret the statements of Khazal in light of them rather than the reverse. How would the Torah T Mima respond? How are we to view the Torah Timima's stance in light of the Ramam's harsh condemnation of those who, in his view, egregiously misinterpret Rubikliniana's statement or commit intellectual suicide with their misguided methodology? Surely he was familiar with the Ramam's approach to these matters. Perhaps when the Torah T Mima listed Shemiras and Mitzvos as one of the outcomes that are in the hands of heaven, he was referring to divine assistance rather than divine compulsion. This is implied by his citation of Khazal's statement, one who comes to purify himself is assisted. He would fully agree with the Ramam that God never compels a person to do a mitvah or an avera. The machlokis might be far narrower than narrower than it seems. Then again, this reading has to contend with his own words, that everything enumerated in the Pasuk, quote, does not refer to Hashem's demand from man, end quote. Divine assistance might explain how these attainments come about, but it doesn't explain why Shmirus and Mittos would be excluded from what Hashem asks of us in the first place. Perhaps the Machlokis is exactly as wide as it appears. The topics of Yurus Hashem, free will, and divine assistance are broad and deep. I am willing to acknowledge that I've misunderstood one or both of the two positions I've analyzed in this article. Regardless, the Ramam's methodology stands firm. No matter what stance we take on these Ikarim, we must subordinate our understanding of Khazal's statements to the Ikarim and not the other way around. Footnote. I've relegated the Ramam's interpretation of the Gumara and Sota to A here, because I don't want it to distract from the discussion at hand. Quote, regarding that which your rabbi said to you, the daughter of so-and-so is for so-and-so, the money of so-and-so is for so-and-so. If this were a divine decree which is equal for everyone, and the statements were intended to be taken, to be understood literally, then why would the Torah say, lest he will die in a war, uh, in the war and another man take her, i.e., the betrothed woman? Tabarim 27, or lest he will die in a war and another man will redeem it, the vineyard, uh 26. Is there any person of understanding in the world for whom this matter would remain a doubt after what is written in the Torah? That which the sages stated, the daughter of so-and-so is for so-and-so, was intended by way of reward and by or by way of punishment, namely, that if this man or this woman had done a mitzvah whose reward is fittingly given to them in the form of a beautiful and praiseworthy match, a kurushbaraku would match them up with each other. Likewise, if they were worthy to be punished by means of a match in which there would be constant strife and war, he would match them up. This is similar to what the rabbis of Blessed Memory said. Even if a momzer, a halachically illegitimate male offspring, is at one end of the earth, and a momseris, a holochically illegitimate female offspring, is at the other end of the earth, a khatushbaraku will bring them and match them up with each other. Yuroshami Kidushin 312. This matter is not equal for everybody, but only for those who are deserving of punishment or who merit reward, all in accordance with that which is upright in the eyes of God. The Gemara is end quote from the Ramam. The Gemara is not saying that God forces a particular man to marry a particular woman, but that he provides a fit a fitting spouse as recompense. This impinges on free will no more and no less than other forms of recompense, like providing or withholding rain in its time.